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ABSTRACT 
This Article presents an original theory of international law 
which reconciles the norm-making processes occurring at the 
international, state, and individual levels.  It is the central thesis of 
this paper that economic globalization is not happening in a 
vacuum, but is rather engendering legal globalization, much in the 
way that centralized regulation followed trans-state economic 
globalization within the United States and Europe. 
Traditional definitions of international law do not address this 
phenomenon and consider these new forms of transnational norm 
creation as simply exceptions to the general rule that international 
law is created by nation-states within the framework of 
multinational institutions.  This Article addresses this serious 
shortcoming in our current definition and understanding of 
international law and the manner in which it is created. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The current theoretical foundations of international law are 
inadequate to explain or address the interrelationship among three 
concurrent and interrelated phenomena: (1) economic 
globalization, (2) legal globalization, i.e, the harmonization of legal 
rules and norms among sovereign entities, a process that itself 
frequently results from economic globalization; and (3) the 
changing role of the nation-state as the principal foundation of 
international law, and as the exclusive protector of the legal, 
economic, and security expectations of the individuals living 
within it. 
The only manner in which to understand these concurrent 
phenomena is through a unified theory of international law that 
recognizes the linkages between each of these historical 
phenomena.  Each phenomenon impacts the other process—and is 
being impacted in return—in a dialectical manner.  These three 
processes require a revision of our conception of international law 
as being solely the creation of states, either among themselves or 
within global legal institutions such as the United Nations or the 
World Trade Organization.1  The process of international 
lawmaking is much more complex and decentralized, and provides 
often overlooked opportunities for non-state actors to effect 
progressive change in the creation of global legal norms.  The 
unified theory presented in this Article is termed “Transnational 
Legal Harmonization,” or “TLH.” 
 
1 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
101 (1987) (limiting the definition of international law to the conduct of “states” 
and “international organizations”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
756 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:3 
 
TLH is principally descriptive, not normative.  It does not 
attempt to describe how the world should be, but rather to explain 
current global processes in a manner that avoids the conceptual 
pitfalls associated with viewing international and domestic law as 
discrete, static processes, occurring in opposition to each other.2  
TLH is a description of a dynamic, organic process.3  TLH occurs as 
a result of phenomena that are already occurring in a myriad of 
unconnected entities, each of which acts according to its own 
normative value system, priorities and goals.  Those entities 
include not only states, but also non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), multinational corporations (MNCs), regional entities, and 
other non-state actors.  TLH is not imposed from above, but is 
organic to the historical evolution of the world economy. 
The globalization of norms that result from the process of TLH 
frequently consists of harmonization of rules rather than direct 
vertical application of international norms from a supranational 
body.  It has implications for the state as the nation-state loses its 
role as the sole propagator of rules protecting and governing its 
citizens.  It also has implications for the individual as individuals 
assert norm creation ability in increasingly diverse manners.  
Ultimately, the process of TLH will impact even traditional 
international law institutions as those bodies respond to pressure 
from below, instead of merely imposing their norms from above. 
Before discussing this unified theory in greater depth, it would 
be helpful to examine the traditional definition of international law 
and how its shortcomings bespeak the need for a new definition of 
international law, as well as a new theory to explain how 
international law is presently created and applied. 
1.1. The Traditional Definition of International Law 
The need for a revised definition of international law, and a re-
conceptualization of the way it is currently created, is apparent 
from the definition of international law used in the American Law 
Institute’s RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
 
2 TLH is therefore agnostic on political theories that advocate “one world 
government” or which attempt to argue for greater protection of individual rights 
through increased powers for international institutions. 
3 The term “organic” is used in this Article according to the definition: 
“Developing naturally: occurring or developing gradually and naturally, without 
being forced or contrived.”  MSN Encarta, Organic Definition, http://dictionary 
.msn.com (search “Dictionary” for “Organic”) (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
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UNITED STATES.  The Restatement reflects the outmoded view of 
international law as simply a legalization of diplomacy4 and a 
product of international institutions.  The Restatement states: 
“International law,” as used in this Restatement, consists of 
rules and principles of general application dealing with the 
conduct of states and of international organizations and 
with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their 
relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.5 
It appears from the language of the Restatement that the 
authors were attempting to grapple with the expanding scope of 
international law by including the last clause “as well as with some 
of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.”6  This 
last clause, however, is hopelessly vague because it doesn’t define 
in any meaningful way which additional relations are covered by 
international law, but simply states “some.”  The Restatement is an 
apt example of how contemporary international law theory suffers 
from incoherence as it clings to a traditional view of international 
law as a kind of legalized diplomacy, while simultaneously 
attempting to grapple with the changing manner in which 
international law is created and applied.  A much more concise 
and accurate definition of international law is simply “a legal rule 
that is binding on more than one country.”7 
1.2. A Revised Definition and Theory of International Law: 
Transnational legal Harmonization 
To the extent that international law is simply one rule binding 
on more than one country, it is created whenever there is 
convergence or harmonization in law among countries.  
International law is not just an assemblage of rules governing the 
 
4 See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 1 (6th ed. 1963) (defining international law as: “the 
body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in 
their relations with one another”). 
5 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 101 
(1987). 
6 Id. 
7 In accordance with this simpler definition, the better definition of 
international organizations under traditional international law is 
“intergovernmental organizations,” which more accurately reflects the equal, 
sovereign, and completely independent relationships among the participating 
states in those organizations. 
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conduct of states and their relations with each other, but rather the 
end product of a legal harmonization process having little to do 
with legal rules regarding conduct among states.  This process can 
occur through traditional forms of international law such as 
treaties.  Furthermore, international law may be effectuated in at 
least six other ways that do not necessarily involve 
intergovernmental organizations.  As we shall see, these forms of 
legal harmonization frequently arises, at least in part, as a result of 
economic harmonization. 
1.2.1. Regional Integration 
First, TLH is manifested through regional integration such as 
the type of “quasi-federal” process occurring in the European 
Union, whereby the norms of a central legal authority are imposed 
on the member states with the direct or indirect consent of the 
member states.  As will be discussed later in this Article, the 
institutions involved in this “federalization” process may acquire a 
more supranational than intergovernmental or traditionally 
international character.  This Article will also discuss the 
similarities between the transformation of international law into 
federal law in the European Union with the process resulting in the 
creation of the United States of America.  This Article will also 
illustrate how other regional efforts such as NAFTA and 
MERCOSUR, ECOWAS, and other regional groupings have 
resulted in not just economic, but also nascent social and legal 
harmonization, albeit sometimes at a very limited level. 
1.2.2. Imposition of Domestic Norms on Foreign Countries 
Second, TLH is manifested by individual states imposing their 
own norms on other countries or entities by means of: (a) 
extraterritorial application of their own domestic law;8 (b) 
conditioning of aid or trade benefits upon a foreign country, 
corporation, or individual’s compliance with certain norms; and (c) 
judicial processes whereby international law norms are applied in 
domestic courts with domestic courts defining the scope and 
substance of the presumably international law norm involved.9 
 
8 Some examples include the European Union’s application of European 
antitrust law to mergers of foreign corporations and vice versa.  Another example 
would be the extraterritorial application of environmental or securities law. 
9 Some examples of this would be certain countries’ application of 
international criminal law to try individuals in domestic courts, with the domestic 
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1.2.3. Private International Law 
Third, TLH is manifested through the creation of non-treaty 
based legal rules by non-state actors in what is commonly called 
“private international law.”  Such law can include standardized 
rules, definitions, or terms adopted by international private 
commercial actors such as the International Chamber of Commerce 
or the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT), which then are uniformly used globally by 
commercial actors.  Since those rules, definitions, or terms are then 
incorporated into global contracts, they form the binding legal 
rules for the relevant business transaction.  Some examples include 
INCOTERMS 2000, which consist of standardized trade definitions 
incorporated into the great majority of international trade 
contracts.10  Other examples include banking terms provided in the 
Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits, which 
constitute the operative legal rules for the vast majority of letter of 
credit transactions.  Moreover, the International Chamber of 
Commerce has a role in creating international rules in such diverse 
areas as E-business, telecoms, financial services, insurance, 
taxation, trade and investment, international transportation, anti-
corruption rules, arbitration, and customs, to name just a few.11 
1.2.4. Harmonization of Customs and Usages of Trade 
Fourth, TLH is manifested by a process that bears many 
similarities to the creation of traditional private international law 
and traditional customary international law.  Certain transnational 
business practices may become sufficiently common to create 
expectation interests in those norms, even if those norms fall short 
of ripening into legally binding customary international law.12 
 
courts determining the substance and scope of the international rule in question.  
See, e.g., Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [1999] 
119 I.L.R. 136 (UKHL 1999) (appeal from Q.B.) (holding that English courts 
retained jurisdiction to try Chilean General Pinochet due to participation in the 
Convention against Torture by the United Kingdom, Chile, and Spain). 
10 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INCOTERMS 2000 (1999) 
(listing and breaking down the four groups of Incoterms and defining relevant 
terminology). 
11 See International Chamber of Commerce—The World Business 
Organization, http://www.iccwbo.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2010) (listing the 
various areas where the International Chamber of Commerce makes policy). 
12 Customary international law is created when a norm is recognized by the 
great majority of countries and those countries comply with that norm out of a 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
760 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:3 
 
For example, the United States Uniform Commercial Code 
(“UCC”) recognizes a type of domestic U.S. law binding on 
contractual parties which bears a great deal of resemblance to 
customary international law.  U.S. UCC § 1-205, titled “Course of 
Dealing and Usage of Trade,” provides an excellent analogy to the 
creation of customary international law and to the process of TLH.  
UCC § 1-205 provides: 
(1) A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct 
between the parties to a particular transaction which is 
fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of 
understanding for interpreting their expressions and other 
conduct. 
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing 
having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or 
trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed 
with respect to the transaction in question.  The existence 
and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts.  If it is 
established that such a usage is embodied in a written trade 
code or similar writing the interpretation of the writing is 
for the court.13 
Under UCC § 1-205, the course of dealing among parties, or the 
customary usage of trade in the particular business of the parties, 
can give rise to legal norms that are binding on a court when two 
parties are in a dispute and the contract among the parties does not 
squarely address the specific issue before the court.  The customs 
of the trade or the course of dealing can thus give rise to norms 
that are as binding as if there were a contract between the parties.  
In other words, the business practices can create transnational 
norms, which are a quintessential form of TLH. 
 
sense of obligation.  This sense of legal obligation on the part of countries is 
commonly referred to as opinio juris.  It distinguishes simple custom, which may 
be followed from simple tradition or habit, from legally-binding customary 
international law, which is followed because countries believe they are supposed 
to follow particular practice or custom, whether or not there is a binding treaty or 
other positive law addressing the issue.  One way to view customary international 
law is that it creates a reasonable expectation interest that a particular practice will 
be followed by a country, as long as that country has not previously indicated its 
intent not to follow the widely practiced custom. 
13 U.C.C. § 1-205 (2008). 
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1.2.5. Harmonization of Legal Regulation Relating to Specific 
Subjects 
Fifth, TLH manifests itself through harmonization of legal 
regulation among countries, which may, although not necessarily, 
occur outside the scope of formal treaties.  For example, the 
European Union and the United States have sought to harmonize 
their antitrust, securities, and other law to avoid inconsistent legal 
actions against corporations operating in both jurisdictions.  
Another example would be the recent efforts to coordinate banking 
and fiscal policies among the world’s major economies in light of 
the global financial crisis. 
1.2.6. Harmonization through Market Forces 
Sixth, TLH manifests itself in the harmonization market forces 
whereby consumers or retailers in one country insist on the 
producer country implementing certain product safety, 
environmental, or other standards in the producer country that are 
consistent with those of the country in which the products are sold.  
Some examples include the controversy over product safety 
standards in China and the requirement of automakers to comply 
with the auto emissions standards of the market in which they 
intend to sell their vehicles.  In other words, as the marketplace for 
goods becomes global, the quality standards for the production of 
those goods increasingly become harmonized as well.  
Nevertheless, it is important not to confuse quality standards for 
production of goods with labor standards associated with the 
production of goods.  As discussed later in this paper, the labor 
conditions in the locale of production remain much less affected by 
TLH.  However, even in these locations, there is some very modest 
movement towards harmonization, albeit primarily in those 
countries that are subject to other forms of pressures for TLH such 
as regional integration. 
One of the most glaring lacuna in the process of TLH is its 
present inability to harmonize labor standards and environmental 
standards in the loci of production.  As will be discussed later, 
there are certain institutional deficiencies in the present operation 
of international law that contribute to this deficiency.  However, at 
least three of the six processes of TLH described above (regional 
integration, imposition of domestic norms, and market pressures) 
have the potential to greatly expand environmental, labor and 
human rights standards. 
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2. IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL HARMONIZATION 
2.1. The Debate over Free Trade 
Economic globalization, and to a somewhat lesser extent the 
associated process of TLH, has frequently been viewed—with 
considerable justification—as adverse to human rights, labor rights 
and environmental protection.  This Article acknowledges TLH’s 
present shortcomings with respect to achieving global harmonized 
norms of basic human rights, labor, and environmental protection.  
This Article nevertheless makes the counterintuitive argument that 
TLH has the potential to result in greater net protection of human 
rights, worker rights, consumer protection, and even the 
environment, although this Article will discuss the very important 
caveats inherent in this assumption.  TLH can be viewed, to some 
extent, as a remedy to the noxious consequences of economic 
globalization.  Economic globalization has usually been adverse to 
individual, labor, and environmental protection in the short and 
medium term, and not infrequently in the long-term as well.  
Nevertheless, this Article will argue that TLH provides an 
opportunity to expand individual, labor, and environmental 
protection in a manner that traditional international law has not 
accomplished. 
2.1.1. The Negatives of Economic Globalization 
Economic globalization has frequently been associated with 
environmental degradation, human exploitation, and other social 
ills.14  Critics of economic globalization argue that it does not 
 
14 Enormous demonstrations and furious street clashes between riot police 
and anti-globalization protestors have characterized almost every meeting 
associated with globalization since the Seattle meeting of the World Trade 
Organization in 1999, including Prague in September 2000, Genoa in July 2001, 
Washington D.C. in September 2002, Santiago in November 2004, and Melbourne 
in November 2006.  These protests have included union members, 
environmentalists, human rights activists and other groups and individuals 
opposed to various aspects of economic globalization.  Their opposition has 
included fierce criticisms of the process of globalization generally, as well as the 
global institutions created to facilitate globalization, principally the World Trade 
Organisation, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.  See, e.g., 
Clare Nullis, Protests Aimed at WTO, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 12, 2001, available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/Article/174/30839.html (last 
visited on Mar. 1, 2010); R.C. Longworth, Globalization Foes Consider Joining Forces 
against WTO, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 20, 2001, available at http://www 
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benefit the people of either developed15 or developing countries.  
Rather globalization only helps multinational corporations by 
enabling them to seek production locales with weak labor and 
environmental protections and other low social and economic costs 
for doing business.  These corporations can then sell their goods 
produced at low-site locales without limitation in high-cost 
markets with elevated environmental, labor and other societal 
protections.  This “race to the bottom” forces countries to abandon 
their own environmental and worker protections in an effort to 
either attract foreign investment, or to avoid losing already existing 
manufacturing capacity.16  Critics of globalization also argue that 
there is a socio-cultural element of globalization that poses a real 
threat to social stability and indigenous cultures, particularly in 
developing countries.17 
 
.globalpolicy.org/component/content/Article/174/30833.html (last visited on 
Mar. 1, 2010). 
15 See, e.g., More Pain Than Gain: Many Workers Are Missing Out on The Rewards 
of Globalisation, ECONOMIST, Sept. 16, 2006, at 12 (arguing that workers’ real wages 
are decreasing as labor productivity is increasing in developed countries, 
debunking the argument that workers are better off as a result of globalization). 
16 Critics of free trade argue that it inevitably compromises the rule of law, 
environmental protectionism and basic human rights by promoting weak 
regulatory institutions to attract foreign investment.  As proof of the negative 
effects of globalization, critics cite the growing disparity in wealth between the 
developed West and the developing Third World.  Even in Europe, where 
international economic institutions engineered the Russian transition from 
communism to a market economy, globalization at times appeared to injure 
instead of help.  Russia’s GDP fell to 60% of China’s GDP within a decade and 
suffered an unprecedented increase in poverty.  See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t. of Commerce, 
Census Brief: Russia’s New Problem – Poverty, CENBR/98-5, Sept. 1998 at 1, available 
at http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/cenbr985.pdf (“Prior to the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. . . .  The Soviet leadership was legitimately 
able to say that their form of socialism had succeeded in virtually eliminating the 
kind of poverty that existed in Czarist Russia.”). 
17 Many of those opposed to free trade argue that it will erode cultural 
diversity by destroying traditional cultural expression (the “McDonald’s effect”).  
Sir James Goldsmith writes that:  
[The] loss of rural employment and [subsequent] migration from the 
countryside to the cities cause a fundamental and irreversible shift.  It 
has contributed throughout the world to the destabilization of rural 
society and to the growth of vast urban concentrations.  In the urban 
slums congregate uprooted individuals whose families have been 
splintered, whose cultural traditions have been extinguished and who 
have been reduced to dependence on welfare from the state. 
SIR JAMES GOLDSMITH, THE TRAP 104 (1994).  Globally mobile capital produces 
financial circumstances that undermine socio-political stability such as the Asian 
financial crises of 1997. 
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2.1.2. The Benefits of Economic Globalization 
Conversely, many proponents of free trade have argued that 
issues related to worker rights, human rights, and the environment 
should be separated from free trade.  These proponents would 
argue that free trade, in and of itself, is a positive thing and that 
any negative consequences of pure free trade pale in comparison to 
its benefits.  Again, because the arguments in favor of globalization 
have been the source of enormous literature, the bulk of that 
discussion will be limited to the footnotes herein.  Those benefits 
can, however, be very briefly summarized as including the 
enormous and historically unprecedented lifting of millions of 
people from poverty in China, India, Vietnam, and other 
countries18 and the development of a substantial middle class for 
the first time in recent history.  Of course it must be acknowledged 
that the reduction of poverty in sheer numbers in the world may be 
accompanied by growing inequality within developing countries.  
Nevertheless, the emerging middle classes have traditionally been 
strong advocates for greater individual and political freedom,19 
 
18 See, e.g., David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Spreading the Wealth, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 
120 (2002).  The authors argue that developing countries that opened their 
economies by easing barriers to trade and seeking direct foreign investment 
accelerated their national growth versus those countries that chose to restrict 
foreign investment and impose high tariffs on imports.  The last twenty years in 
China and India exemplify this connection between economic growth and a 
subsequent reduction in poverty.  World Bank studies estimate that China’s GDP 
grew at ten percent on average per year whereas real income increased by six 
percent a year in India.  Between 1981 and 2001, the proportion of the population 
living in poverty in China fell from fifty-three percent to just eight percent.  The 
World Bank, Research—Fighting Poverty: Findings and Lessons from China’s 
Success, http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/ 
EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20634060~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~the
SitePK:469382,00.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).  Moreover, the CIA World 
Factbook reported that Chinese poverty was estimated to be at 2.8% in 2006.  
Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, Population Below Poverty Line, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2046.html 
?countryName=China&countryCode=ch&regionCode=eas&#ch (last visited Mar. 
1, 2010).  Statistics document a similar decrease in poverty rates in India: 
Estimated to be at twenty-six percent in 2005, down from fifty-two percent in 
1981.  The World Bank, India—New Global Poverty Estimates, http://www 
.worldbank.org.in/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/INDI
AEXTN/0,,contentMDK:21880725~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:29558
4,00.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
19 See, e.g., LARRY DIAMOND, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered 
in REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY 93 (Gary Marks and Larry Diamond eds., 1992) 
(critiquing Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy, 53 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 69, 71–85 (1959)).  The author argues that an increase in economic 
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although this traditional development has been notably lacking in 
countries such as China and Russia.  This traditional development 
derives in part from the greater participation of women in the 
economic20 and even political systems,21 and greater access of the 
 
prosperity creates a middle class. Id. at 119.  This middle class inevitably vocalizes 
its desire for more political representation resulting in the rise of democratic 
institutions. Id. at 119–121.  The author acknowledges that scholars criticized 
Lipset’s connection between economic growth and democracy during the 1960s 
and 1970s when the world watched almost every fledgling democratic nation 
disappear into authoritarian regimes. Id. at 114.  The author contends that the 
political transformations throughout Europe, East Asia and Latin America in the 
1980s, that followed robust periods of economic development or coincided with a 
shift to a free market economy, appear to affirm the link between increased 
economic prosperity and the development of democracy.  Id. at 126–27  Thus, 
where the existing government functions as an authoritarian regime, “prolonged 
economic success can contribute to the [public] perception that the exceptional 
coercive measures of the non-democratic regime are no longer necessary” and 
inspire the populace to force political change. JUAN LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, 
PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION 78 (1996). 
20 Between 1990 and 2001/2002, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and 
Uruguay, the percentage of women in each country’s population earning a non-
farm wage increased an average of 5.4% over the period.  See POPULATION 
REFERENCE BUREAU, 2005 WOMEN OF OUR WORLD 10 (2005) [hereinafter WOMEN OF 
OUR WORLD] (reporting the percent of women non-farm wage earners in South 
American countries in 1990 and 2001–2002). 
21 Between 1995 and 2004, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay, the 
percentage of women in each country’s parliament increased 6.4% on average.  See 
WOMEN OF OUR WORLD, supra note 20 (reporting the percentage of women in 
parliament in South American Countries in 1995 and 2004).  The Freedom in the 
World survey by Freedom House measured freedom in Argentina, Peru, Brazil, 
Uruguay and Chile between 2002 and 2008.  The survey examined the 
opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the 
government and other centers of potential domination—according to two broad 
categories: political rights and civil liberties.  Political rights enable people to 
participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for 
distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political 
parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact 
on public policies and are accountable to the electorate.  Civil liberties allow for 
the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule 
of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state.  Freedom 
House rated both Brazil and Argentina as only partly free in 2002 with a score of 
3.0 on a scale of 1 to 7—for political rights and an analogous rating for civil 
liberties; a rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest 
level of freedom.  See generally FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE 
ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 2001–2002 48, 66, 118 
(Adrian Karatnycky & Aili Piano eds., 2002).  Chile and Peru earned a score of 2.0, 
free on the scale, in 2002.  Id. at 153, 477.  Uruguay had a score of 1.0 in 2002.  Id. at 
633.  In 2008, every country except Peru increased freedom for its citizens.  See 
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2008: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL 
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 41, 109, 156, 557, 759 (Arch Puddington et al. eds., 
2008) (examining the status of civil and political rights in various South American 
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population to technological resources that connect them with 
diverse views,22 although the efforts of China’s government to 
block internet sites, and the efforts of the Russian government to 
manipulate domestic internet sites, and the media in general, 
suggest that increased internet usage is not perfectly correlated 
with greater access to diverse viewpoints. 
With respect to the environment, it has been argued that 
overall economic growth as a result of trade can contribute to the 
development of cleaner technologies within a country’s 
manufacturing sector,23 although the extensive environmental 
degradation in China’s industrial sector suggests that the 
correlation between a country’s economic wealth and 
environmental improvement is shaky, and in any event, far from 
immediate. 
2.1.3. TLH as a Potential Remedy? 
This Article will demonstrate that both sides of the debate over 
free trade make the conceptual mistake of viewing economic 
globalization as a separate process from legal globalization and/or 
harmonization.  In part, this conceptual misunderstanding arises 
from the widespread perception that the only possible regulator of 
the multinational corporation and the global economy is the 
nation-state.  This Article will argue, however, that the process of 
TLH has the potential for changing the traditional role of the state, 
international institutions, and even the individual in making 
international law. 
This perception of immunity from regulation is buttressed by 
the World Trade Organisation’s prohibition of unilateral 
 
countries).  Argentina and Brazil rose to 2.0; Chile shifted to 1.0 and Uruguay 
remained constant whereas Peru slipped to 2.5.  Id. 
22 Between 2000 and 2008, Internet usage increased in Argentina by 540%, in 
Brazil by 900%, in Chile by 320%, in Peru by 205%, and in Uruguay by 197%.  See 
Internet Usage World Stats—Internet and Population Statistics, http://www 
.internetworldstats.com (last visited on Mar. 1, 2010). 
23 See, for example, David I. Stern, The Rise and Fall of the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve, 32 WORLD DEV. 1419 (2004), wherein the author argues that an 
increase in economic prosperity may reduce pollution and employs a statistical 
analysis of this relationship through a bell shaped curve — called the Kuznets 
environmental curve — that depicts pollution levels initially rising with income 
then falling as income continues to increase.  See generally Gene M. Grossman and 
Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and the Environment, 110 QUARTERLY J. OF ECON. 
353 (1995) (discussing economists’ estimates of the income level at which certain 
kinds of pollution peak). 
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imposition of environmental, labor or human rights standards that 
restrict trade, with some exceptions.  As discussed infra, this refusal 
of the WTO to link trade with issues of human rights, the 
environment and business regulation is a clear limitation on the 
expansion of non-trade legal regulation through a global 
“commerce clause.”  Nevertheless, the process of TLH may make it 
easier to link the issues in a manner independent of the WTO, but 
still legally recognized by the WTO.24  The United Nations cannot 
effectively regulate market forces since it is limited by the lowest 
common denominator of its diverse and numerous members and 
its focus on international security rather than regulation. 
These traditional views of free trade and regulation overlook 
the central thesis of this Article that economic globalization very 
frequently leads to harmonization of law with respect to vast areas 
of legal regulation that are normally considered the province of 
state or domestic law.  This last correlation is not inevitable, but 
this Article discusses below too many historical and contemporary 
examples of the correlation to argue that the correlation does not 
exist.  For example, as discussed in greater length below, the 
United States and the European Union have “federalized” 
individual liberties in the United States and the European Union.  
The Council of Europe has harmonized individual liberties at a 
somewhat lower level throughout Europe, and this Article would 
argue that the reasons for the Council’s lower level of protection is 
precisely because it is not linked to a common market.25  
MERCOSUR has increasingly established minimum human rights 
norms having little to do with trade within its enormous trading 
block.26  The OAS, meanwhile, has somewhat less successfully 
attempted to harmonize human rights standards in the Americas.  
It has been hamstrung by not linking its attempts with trade, 
whereas membership in the Council of Europe was at least viewed 
as a precursor to membership in the EU common market.  Note 
though that Russia’s membership has weakened this assumption 
 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 130-135. 
25 In fact, it could be argued that some of its success is related to membership 
in the Council of Europe as a prerequisite to joining the European Union.  Indeed, 
the admission of Russia, with the little chance of ultimate EU membership it has, 
weakened the credibility of the Council of Europe human rights system as 
binding on member nations. 
26 See infra text accompanying notes 119–124. 
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and the credibility of the Council of Europe’s human rights 
enforcement credibility. 
Cars sold on a global level have to meet California emission 
standards,27 at least if the carmakers wish to take advantage of the 
huge Californian market, and the product safety concerns raised 
over China’s products have demonstrated that even goods 
produced in countries with traditionally lower safety standards 
will, to some extent, have to meet the safety standards of those 
markets with higher standards. 
The United States and the European Union are currently in the 
process of harmonizing their anti-trust and securities standards.  
The European Union has blocked numerous mergers between 
United States companies due to the effect of those mergers on the 
European Union market.28  Consider the scrutiny Microsoft faced 
in the European Union even as it eventually passed the anti-trust 
hurdles raised by the United States Department of Justice.  Various 
countries, including the United States, require that developing 
countries comply with “international labor rights” before they are 
granted tariff treatment more favorable than the standard Most 
Favored Nation treatment required by the World Trade 
Organization.  Despite these developments, economic globalization 
has exploited the areas of labor rights and environmental 
regulation, the areas in which TLH has had the least success in 
effectuating substantial progress.  Nevertheless, TLH, because it 
does not require the imposition of norms on recalcitrant countries, 
also has the greatest potential to effectuate progressive change in 
these areas.  As demonstrated below, TLH has the potential to 
effectuate progressive change because it operates on the same 
principle that underlies federalism and other regional integrative 
systems—the linkage between commerce and legal rights and most 
importantly the indirect link to trade. 
 
27 Cal. Dep’t. of Motor Vehicles, What You Need to Know before Buying a Vehicle 
from Out-of-State, http://www.dmv.ca.gov/pubs/brochures/fast_facts 
/ffvr29.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2010) (describing California’s requirement that 
imported cars must be altered in order to meet emissions standards before being 
registered in the state). 
28 See Jeremy Grant & Damien J. Neven, The Attempted Merger Between General 
Electric and Honeywell: A Case Study of Transatlantic Conflict, 1 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 
595, 596 (2005) (examining the decision by the European Union to prevent the 
merger of United States companies General Electric and Honeywell). 
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2.2. Federal Law and International Law 
In undertaking this analysis, this Article will call upon 
contemporary and historical case studies of independent countries 
forming a federal, confederative or other multinational integrative 
legal structure with regulatory power over a wide number of 
issues, even though such associations derived initially from efforts 
at economic integration.  Those case studies principally focus 
individually on the European Union, the United States, 
MERCOSUR, ECOWAS, NAFTA and the African Union.  The legal 
harmonization resulting from these different national associations 
vary widely.  Some of the associations help to demonstrate the 
challenges facing the process of TLH in balancing the interests of 
economic globalization and insuring the health and individual 
liberties of the world’s citizens. 
TLH is comparable to the development of federalism in the 
United States, the development of the European Union, and the 
growing legal harmonization among different countries and 
economic regional groupings.  The Article will also argue that TLH 
has parallels to the incorporation of fundamental civil, political, 
economic, and social human rights on a federal level in the US and 
the European Union.  This “federalization” of economic, social, 
economic and human rights could not and would not have 
occurred without the initial economic harmonization that helped 
provide the initial impetus for these regional groupings.  These 
regional groupings then eventually metamorphasized into 
something much more profound and much more protective of the 
human rights of the individual than could have been envisioned by 
the original protagonists of economic integration. 
TLH has resulted in increasing transnational and trans-regional 
harmonization of laws and legal rules with respect to such diverse 
substantive areas as anti-trust, securities regulation,29 labor 
standards, environmental regulation,30 human rights, contract 
 
29 This is illustrated in securities regulation trends between the United States 
and the European Union.  See generally Eric J. Pan, Harmonization of U.S.-EU 
Securities Regulation: The Case for a Single European Securities Regulator, 34 LAW & 
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 499 (2003) (describing the reasons securities regulation between 
the United States and the European are moving towards harmonization and 
should be further unified). 
30 We see this illustrated in the Andean nations in South America.  See 
generally Victor Tafur-Domínguez, International Environmental Harmonization—
Emergence and Development of the Andean Community, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 283 
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law,31 and human health and safety, as the world community 
attempts to effectuate a global market, and finds that other kinds of 
regulation are necessary in order to do so effectively.32 
2.3. The Role of the Nation-State as the Guarantor of Individual Rights 
and the Environment 
This Article argues that the process of economic globalization is 
leading to the globalization of law, referred to in this Article as 
TLH.  TLH, almost by definition, involves the concurrent 
transformation of the traditional role of the state as the sole 
guarantor of individual social, economic and other human rights, 
cultural identity, and individual security against domestic and 
external threats.  This Article will also argue that the traditional 
model of the nation-state, under traditional international law and 
political scientific terms, is obsolete.  From an empirical 
perspective, the traditional model of the nation-state is obsolete, 
since it does not accurately describe current or historical reality.  It 
is also problematic from a normative perspective, since the very 
notion of the nation-state is often incompatible with fundamental 
human rights principles.  This is particularly the case when the 
state is the juridical embodiment of the dominant ethnic or cultural 
group. 
 
(2000) (describing harmonization trends in the Andean community with respect to 
environmental law). 
31 Trends in the harmonization of contract law can be observed in Africa and 
Europe.  See generally Salvatore Mancuso, Trends on the Harmonization of Contract 
Law in Africa, 13 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 157 (2007) (describing the benefits 
of—and the obstacles to achieving—contract law harmonization in Africa, a 
continent marked with particular cultural and legal diversity); Gülüm 
Bayraktaroğlu, Harmonization of Private International Law at Different Levels: 
Communitarization v. International Harmonization, 5 EUR. J. L. REFORM 127 (2003) 
(discussing harmonization between member states of the European Union). 
32 See generally Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Harmonization of European 
Securities Law, 37 INT’L LAW 211 (2003) (discussing the difficulties of implementing 
the EU securities code sans other regulation); Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the 
Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: The Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 401 (1995) (discussing the same phenomena in the context 
NAFTA); Tracy A. Kaye, European Tax Harmonization and the Implications for U.S. 
Tax Policy, 19 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 109 (1996) (discussing the same 
phenomena in the European Union taxation system); Virginia Boyd, Financial 
Privacy in the United States and the European Union: A Path to Transatlantic 
Regulatory Harmonization, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 939 (2006) (highlighting the same 
phenomena by describing the role of data protection in the financial realms of the 
United States and the European Union). 
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Examples of such incompatibility between the traditional 
nation-state and fundamental human rights and democracy can be 
seen in the increasing phenomena of separate nations arising 
within a single state.  Some examples include the post-Franco 
emergence of the nation of Catalonia within the State of Spain, the 
establishment of Scottish and Welsh parliaments in the United 
Kingdom as part of that country’s process of devolution, the 
uneasy co-existence of the Flemish and Walloon national groups 
within the State of Belgium with parallel political parties, 
educational systems and other parallel state institutions,33 the 
existence of officially recognized French, German, Italian and 
Romansch cantons in Switzerland,34 and Quebec’s emergence as a 
separate nation within Canada, with sovereignty over language, 
immigration, culture, and a myriad of other issues.35 
Finally, to the extent the European Union has assumed many of 
the traditional economic and other regulatory functions of a state, 
the European Union can increasingly be viewed as a state 
composed of numerous nations.  This has become increasingly true 
as the elimination of borders within the European Union has lead 
to the centralization of state regulatory functions, state security 
functions related to protection of the territorial region, and 
regulation of immigration and protection of European Union 
citizens from threats to their personal security.  This Article will 
provide an empirical and historical examination of the historically 
aberrational and increasingly obsolete role of the nation-state as 
the fundamental building block and source of international law. 
3. OLLIE’S BARBEQUE AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE PARALLELS 
BETWEEN FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL NORM CREATION 
It may seem odd to introduce a unified theory of international 
law, the state, and the individual with a United States case that 
 
33 See Belgian Government Website, The Structure of The Federal State and 
the Power Levels, http://www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/government 
/federale_staat/structure/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2010) (discussing the unique legal 
structure of the Flemish, Walloon, and Brussels regions). 
34 See ANDREAS WIMMER, NATIONALIST EXCLUSION AND ETHNIC CONFLICT: 
SHADOWS OF MODERNITY 233 (2002) (“French, Italian and Romansch are not 
considered to be less ‘typically Swiss’ or less representative of the Swiss nation 
than German.”). 
35 See generally Quebec Government Website, http://www.gouv.qc.ca 
/portail/quebec/pgs/commun/?lang=en (last visited Jan. 20, 2010) (indicating 
Quebec’s significantly independent sovereign status within Canada). 
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involved the outlawing of segregation in restaurant in 
Birmingham, Alabama.  Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court 
cases that outlawed segregation, Katzenbach v. McClung,36 and its 
companion case Heart of Atlanta,37 provide a vivid illustration of 
one of the central themes of this work: the ways in which “supra-
state” authorities such as federal law and international law have 
operated to vastly expand individual human rights protections, 
environmental regulations, and economic regulation in ways that 
blur the traditional view of states as sovereign entities with plenary 
authority to regulate individuals and other non-state actors within 
their territory.  This Article will explore how United States federal 
law, European Union “federal” law, and international law have 
used their respective equivalents of the Commerce Clause, and the 
implied power associated with that commerce power, to regulate 
areas of the law quite removed from those associated with trade.  
In other words, the process of legal harmonization at work in the 
United States is qualitatively not radically different from the 
process of legal harmonization at work elsewhere in the world. 
As this Article will illustrate, the distinction between federal 
law and international law is much hazier than commonly 
supposed, and in fact the process of implied power of supra-state 
authority based on trade power in Katzenbach is, in many respects, 
equally applicable to international law.  Federal and international 
law can thus be viewed as points along a spectrum ranging from 
pure international law, such as that embodied in 
international/intergovernmental institutions like the United 
Nations, to purely unitary, domestic law exemplified by non-
federal states such as Japan or Romania.  This Article will explore 
how international law is being created in ways that fall outside the 
traditional definition of international law, and outside the 
traditional concepts of how international law is created.  To this 
end, the Article will discuss the ways in which international law is 
created by non-state actors and in ways far removed from the 
traditional view of international law as a creation of international 
institutions. 
 
36 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305 (1964) (holding that Congress 
did not exceed its powers by prohibiting racial discrimination in restaurants that 
have close ties to interstate commerce). 
37 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) 
(holding that Congress did not exceed its Commerce Clause powers by 
prohibiting racial discrimination in motels that serve interstate commerce). 
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In December 1964, the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the “Civil Rights Act”)38 in the seminal 
case Katzenbach v. Clung.  The Civil Rights Act, among other things, 
eliminated segregation in public accommodations, including 
hotels, restaurants, theaters, retail stores, and similar 
establishments.  The challenge to the Civil Rights Act presented in 
Katzenbach resulted from the absence of any explicit Constitutional 
basis for the federal government to regulate systematic 
discrimination by individuals within the several states. 
Indeed, prior to the passage of the 14th Amendment following 
the Civil War, the federal government had virtually no 
Constitutional power to regulate the states’ treatment of their own 
residents, even when those actions, such as slavery, which would 
now be characterized as crimes against humanity.  States were 
largely free to treat their own citizens as cruelly or arbitrarily as 
they wished, as long as such policies did not affect the common 
market, foreign policy, or other limited area of federal jurisdiction.  
At the risk of stating the obvious, states could even enslave their 
own inhabitants and no state was under any requirement to 
provide any of the rights contained in the federal bill of rights to 
their own citizens. 
In other words, prior to the passage of the 14th Amendment, 
the United States federal government had less legal power to 
regulate human rights abuses by U.S. states against their citizens 
than international law has to regulate human rights abuses by 
countries against their own citizens.  In this respect, states enjoyed 
more sovereignty and autonomy from federal interference than 
individual nations currently enjoy in the international legal system.  
It is true that many countries are largely free to ignore international 
law with little fear of coercive repercussions, but they may not do 
so legally.  The states in the United States, on the other hand, could 
violate the most basic rights of the humans living within their 
borders with legal impunity. 
Even after the Civil War and the passage of the 14th 
Amendment, states still enjoyed certain kinds of sovereignty that 
even sovereign nations do not currently enjoy under international 
law.  The concept of sovereignty normally implies the power to 
regulate the activity of individuals residing within the territory of 
 
38 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as and 
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
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the sovereign.  Nevertheless, the United States Constitution 
originally envisioned the several states—not the federal 
government—as the primary regulators of individual activity, and 
this regulatory division continued even after the Civil War. 
The inability of federal law to protect or regulate the conduct of 
individuals, as opposed to the respective states, is much more 
characteristic of traditional international law, not domestic law—
Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland 
notwithstanding.39  Indeed, the growth of international criminal 
law has even shattered that fundamental distinction between 
international and domestic law. 
This division of power left the federal government unable to 
prevent states from creating the pervasive system of private 
segregation that would now be characterized as a violation of jus 
cogens international law,40 at least until Ollie’s Barbeque was forced 
to serve its delectable, artery-hardening ribs to black and white 
customers equally.41 
The United States Supreme Court was forced to resort to the 
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution because, as 
mentioned above, no other Constitutional authority existed for 
federal regulation of individual discrimination of the kind 
presented by Ollie’s Barbeque.  However, as noted by the United 
States Supreme Court, Ollie’s Barbeque was not alleged to have 
served customers from other states and certainly not customers 
 
39 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404–05 (1819) (“The 
government of the Union, then . . . is, emphatically and truly, a government of the 
people. In form, and in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted 
by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.”).  It could 
be argued that Justice Marshall’s need to argue that the Constitution derived from 
the people of the United States, rather than from an agreement of sovereign states, 
is itself an indication that his sentiments were not universally shared at the time of 
his opinion.  Indeed, Justice Marshall notes that “the counsel for the state of 
Maryland have deemed it of some importance, in the construction of the 
constitution [sic], to consider that instrument, not as emanating from the people, 
but as the act of sovereign and independent states.”  Id. at 402. 
40 The practice of segregation was not limited to private actors after the Civil 
War, at least until Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny dismantled state-
sponsored segregation.  Nevertheless, the 14th Amendment could have permitted 
federal prevention of state laws requiring segregation if the U.S. Supreme Court 
had viewed such laws as a violation of equal protection.  Thus, the existence of 
state segregation was not technically a lacuna in federal power, but instead the 
result of the characterization of segregation itself by the US Supreme Court. 
41 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
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from other nations.42  The Supreme Court ultimately found the link 
between the restaurant’s discrimination and the Commerce Clause 
in the $70,000 worth of food served annually by the restaurant, 
some of which arrived at Ollie’s Barbeque via interstate 
commerce.43  Katzenbach and its progeny enabled the federal 
government to exercise almost full sovereignty over its citizens 
until the application of the implied power of the federal 
government to regulate individual activity was checked, albeit in a 
limited fashion, by United States v. Lopez.44 
Thus, it was only with the successful implementation of the 
Civil Rights Act that United States federalism achieved a full 
conceptual break with traditional international concepts giving 
each state the sovereign authority to regulate its own citizens.  As 
this Article will discuss, the history of United States federalism is 
not an isolated example of sovereign entities coming together and 
delegating power to a central authority over limited areas of 
substantive law—it is simply an early example. 
3.1. The Creation of the United States: From Confederation to 
Federalism 
It is helpful to examine the creation of the United States to fully 
appreciate the evolution of United States federalism from a form of 
government that, in contemporary terminology, would be 
characterized as a kind of confederative international law, into a 
form of government that is now unquestionably “domestic” law.  
Some scholars have gone so far as to posit that the United States 
Constitution itself could, in substantive terms, be most accurately 
characterized as an international treaty among sovereign entities 
 
42 Id. at 298 (“There is no claim that interstate travelers frequented the 
restaurant. The sole question, therefore, narrows down to whether Title II, as 
applied to a restaurant annually receiving about $70,000 worth of food which has 
moved in commerce, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress.”). 
43 See id. at 300.  Congress had provided in section 201(b)(2) and (c) of Title II, 
that the Civil Rights Act covers “any ‘restaurant . . . principally engaged in selling 
food for consumption on the premises’ under the Act ‘if . . . it serves or offers to 
serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves . . . 
has moved in commerce.’”  Id. at 298 (omissions in original). 
44 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551–52 (1995) (finding that Congress 
did not have the power to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 because, 
in part, the possession of a gun within a school zone—a private, individual act—
was insufficiently related to interstate commerce). 
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rather than an organic creation of a unitary sovereign entity.45  It 
has been argued that since the United States was not a single 
country at the time of the creation of the United States, politically, 
economically, or even conceptually, there could not be a single 
“American people” from which an organic Constitution could 
emanate.  In arguing that the federal government was a creation of 
the people, not of the sovereign states, Chief Justice Marshall 
nevertheless recognized, in the seminal 1819 case McCulloch v. 
Maryland, the opposing view.  “It has been said, that the people 
had already surrendered all their powers to the State sovereignties, 
and had nothing more to give [the federal government].”46  
McCulloch v. Maryland undoubtedly established, as a legal matter, 
the Federalist view of the Constitution as a product of a unitary 
people, not the states, even if the historical reality was apparently 
more ambiguous.47 
The states of the United States did not transform themselves 
from a collection of British colonies into a single country upon their 
declaration of independence from Britain.  Rather the political 
integration of the states of the United States has been much more 
gradual, and it can be argued that the United States, in many 
respects, did not even achieve the level of political and economic 
integration achieved by the present-day European Union until the 
very recent past. 
The antebellum United States resembled a confederation of 
truly sovereign, independent states much more than the current 
European Union.  This was reflected in much of the U.S. legal 
literature and legal reality of the period.  For example, antebellum 
legal theorists such as John C. Calhoun viewed the American union 
in terms that would currently be considered confederative, rather 
than federal.48  These legal theorists took the 10th Amendment to 
 
45 See, e.g., FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN, THE CONSTITUTION AS TREATY: THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONALIST APPROACH TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
(2007) (making the argument that the Constitution is an international treaty 
among sovereign entities—the states). But see McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 404–05 
(declaring that the federal government’s power derives from the people).  
46 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 404. 
47 See MARTIN, supra note 45. 
48 As Larry Catá Backer explains: 
Under the old American orthodoxy, only nations can be federations, and 
only nations are governed by constitutions.  Only constitutions can serve 
as the highest expression of domestic law.  But federal systems have 
emerged which may not be nations, as conventionally understood.  
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the United States Constitution and state sovereignty theories 
seriously; not just as jingoistic assertions of anti-Northern 
sentiment, but as expressions of the original concept of United 
States federalism as thirteen independent nations delegating 
certain limited powers to a central government and otherwise 
retaining the attributes of state sovereignty.  This view of state 
sovereignty is consistent with the empirical political reality of the 
United States.  There is no other historical example in the last three 
centuries of one legally unified country where a class of people 
were full citizens in some jurisdictions and slaves in other 
jurisdictions within the same country.  It is similarly 
uncharacteristic of a single unified country that as late as 1966, a 
mixed-race couple could be legally married in one state and be 
arrested and imprisoned for being married in another state.49 
3.2. The Articles of Confederation 
The Articles of Confederation, in existence from 1776 to 1789,50 
were not just a failed, ineffectual historical blip on the way to the 
inevitable creation of a “federal” United States.  Rather, the Articles 
were an accurate representation of the newly independent states’ 
perception that they were sovereign, independent countries.51  
 
These non-nation federal systems are also governed by constitutions.  
These constitutions are derived from international law, yet they perform 
the core functions traditionally reserved for the basic internal law of 
nations.  As core principles of transnational and international law 
become part of the domestic law of nations, and as nations themselves 
become subordinate parts of larger governmental organizations, the line 
between domestic and international law blurs.  This is the brave new 
world of federal constitutionalism in the twenty-first century. 
Larry Catá Backer, The Extra-National State: American Confederate Federalism and the 
European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 173, 178 (2001) (internal citations omitted).  
49 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (finding state anti-miscegenation 
statutes unconstitutional). 
50 See Library of Congress, The Articles of Confederation, 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Articles.html (last visited Jan. 31, 
2010) (explaining that the Second Continental Congress, representing the newly 
independent colonies, began drafting the Articles in July 1776, and sent the 
Articles to the states for ratification in November 1777.  The completion of the 
ratification process did not occur until March 1781, but the final draft of the 
Articles served as the de facto system of government until the Articles’ final 
ratification.  The Articles remained in effect until 1789.). 
51 See, e.g., ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II  (“Each State retains its 
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and 
right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, 
in Congress assembled.”).  See also KEITH L. DOUGHERTY, COLLECTIVE ACTION 
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Consistent with a collection of sovereign states, the Congress had 
no power to enforce its laws or impose taxes.52  As with any 
collection of independent countries, each state had an equal vote in 
Congress, a system still reflected in the current United States 
Senate.  The Articles of Confederation were simply a pragmatic 
effort to create greater unity among those independent states in the 
face of the threat from Great Britain during the ongoing War of 
Independence and in foreign policy matters generally.  In no way 
did the countries under the Articles view themselves as anything 
other than fully sovereign countries with full control over their 
economic, legal and domestic political affairs, except to the extent 
such matters might be delegated on a limited basis to other 
entities—much as contemporary countries delegate certain discrete 
economic, political and security matters to transnational or 
international entities.53 
The Articles created a “Congress of the Confederation,” whose 
formal name was the “United States of America in congress 
assembled.”54  Each state, regardless of its size and consistent with 
an intergovernmental organization, was entitled to one vote in the 
Congress55 —this remains true with the present day United States 
Senate.56  Each state maintained its own currency, customs controls 
and port fees.57  They imposed tariffs on goods from other states 
and Congress had no ability to regulate trade,58 although the 
people’s freedom of movement was guaranteed. 
As noted, Congress had no power to enforce its laws and had 
no power to impose taxes, but simply had the right to request 
 
UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION (2001) (explaining that while the states 
were not required to contribute to the national government, they had incentives to 
give the government funds); Backer, supra note 48, at 197 (pointing out that the 
European Union is similar to Antebellum states in that an autonomous general 
government can remain stable and democratic, only if it has built into it 
mechanisms for the dispersion and diffusion of power between the general 
government and its constituent parts). 
52 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX. 
53 See id. art. II. (“Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and 
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this 
confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”) 
54 Id. pmbl. 
55 Id. art. V § 4. 
56 Id. art. V; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
57 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (not including these abilities in 
Congress’s enumerated powers). 
58 Id. 
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contributions to its budgets from the several states.  The Congress 
even lacked the means to compel such contributions by the states, 
and the requested contributions were frequently not met.59 
The practical problems inherent in the Articles, particularly the 
inability to compel contributions to the central treasury and to stop 
economic conflicts among the states, led many American leaders to 
contemplate a substantial revision of the Articles, which ultimately 
led to the creation of an entirely new document:  the United States 
Constitution. 
3.3. The U.S. Constitution 
The political integration of the U.S. states during and following 
the ratification of the Constitution has been much misunderstood.  
The federalism that existed at the time of the Constitution’s 
creation was a very different kind of political integration than what 
is currently understood to be federalism.60  At the founding, the 
U.S. Constitution and the Articles of Confederation differed in 
significant ways.  However, the scope of this difference appears 
greater when viewed in hindsight than it actually was at the time 
the Constitution was created.  In terms of present-day 
understandings of political institutions, federalism at the time of 
the founding was more akin to our present system of international 
law than domestic law.  At the danger of echoing the rhetoric of 
those who promoted slavery, segregation and other atrocities 
under the banner of “states rights,”61 it is nevertheless important to 
recognize that the structure of the Constitution reflected the 
widespread view at the time of the Constitution’s creation that the 
United States was more like a union of quasi-sovereign entities 
than a truly single political entity.  The paradox of a “union” of 
“sovereign entities” reflects the tension inherent in the experiment 
that was the early United States.  There can be little question that 
the Supreme Court of the United States, as a legal matter, 
 
59 DOUGHERTY, supra note 51, at 7. 
60 See Backer, supra note 48, at 183 (noting that pre-Civil War conceptions of 
federalism valued “the great animating principles of for the concurrent majority 
and nullification”). 
61 Contrary to those advocates of states’ rights, a central thesis of this Article 
is that the federalization of civil rights in the United States resulted in a vast 
increase in net individual and human rights in the United States, even though this 
laudable development may not have been explicitly intended by many of the 
Founders. 
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definitively resolved the supremacy of the central government in 
McCulloch v. Maryland,62 yet the very existence of the case suggests 
that the legal issue was not completely resolved prior to the 
Court’s decision.  The discussion below illustrates more fully the 
hazy distinction between early American federalism and 
contemporary international law. 
First, the political structure of the U.S. government was more 
characteristic of a union of sovereign, or quasi-sovereign states, 
rather than a single political entity.63  As noted above, the Articles 
gave each state an equal voice in the Congress of the Confederation 
regardless of that state’s population, which is consistent with a 
confederation of independent states.  To some extent, this structure 
continued under the new Constitution with a Senate consisting of 
two senators from each state regardless of population.  This 
structure is even more striking when one compares the political 
structure created by the Constitution to that of the European 
Union.  The European Union, like the United States, faced a 
conflict between more and less populated states.  The compromise 
in both entities was to create a representative body based on 
population and a body that reflected the equal weight of each state, 
which is also characteristic of intergovernmental bodies.64  In the 
European Union, two of the bodies created were the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers, with the Parliament being 
analogous to the United States House of Representatives and the 
 
62 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that state 
action may not impede valid, constitutional exercises of power by the federal 
government). 
63 See, e.g., ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II (“Each State retains its 
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and 
right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, 
in Congress assembled.”). 
64 U.S. Senate: The Connecticut Compromise, http://www.senate.gov 
/artandhistory/art/common/generic/Connecticut_Compromise_Unveiling.htm 
(Last visited Jan. 31, 2010) 
When the framers of the U.S. Constitution met at Independence Hall in 
Philadelphia on July 16, 1787, they reached a crucial agreement that 
provided for a dual system of congressional representation. . . . This 
Great Compromise, or Connecticut Compromise, was named in honor of 
its architects, Connecticut delegates Roger Sherman and Oliver 
Ellsworth. 
See also Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 234, Mar. 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter “Treaty of 
Rome”]. 
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Council of Ministers being analogous to the United States Senate.  
However, unlike the Senate, each country’s vote in the Council of 
Ministers corresponds to the country’s population however 
inaccurately.65  In this sense, the Senate continues to be a much less 
representative institution of the people of the entire country than 
the Council of Ministers is of the people of the European Union.  
Although this singular aspect of the United States’ political 
structure does not render the United States federal structure more 
international than the European Union, it does reflect that the 
tensions between sovereignty and union in the creation of the 
Constitution were very similar to those present during the 
contemporary discussions of the European Union’s political 
structure. 
Second, the Constitution appears to reflect assumptions about 
the right to withdraw from the Union that would be more 
characteristic of a union of sovereign states.  Legal commentators 
such as Daniel Farber have argued that the failure of the writers of 
the Constitution to include a provision regarding the right to 
withdraw from the Union was not accidental, but rather reflected a 
lack of unanimity on the issue.66  The lack of such a provision is 
even more surprising given the Articles’ formal title: “The Articles 
of Confederation and Perpetual Union.”  Although Farber 
ultimately concludes that the Constitution prohibited secession, he 
cites Thomas Jefferson and John Calhoun for his proposition that 
this view was not unanimous among the early American leaders 
and was therefore left out of the finished document.67  The ongoing 
debate during the first decades of the United States regarding 
whether states had the right to unilaterally nullify federal laws 
 
65 See Council of the European Union, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst 
/council/index_en.htm (Last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (noting that decisions in the 
Council are taken by vote such that the bigger the country’s population, the more 
votes it has, but the numbers are weighted in favor of the less populous 
countries). 
66 See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION (2003) (examining the 
principles through which Abraham Lincoln defended his executive actions during 
his administration, especially with respect to military and political decisions 
during the Civil War). 
67 See generally id.; cf. THOMAS DI LORENZO, THE REAL LINCOLN (Prima 
Lifestyles 2002) (suggesting that Abraham Lincoln revolutionized the functions of 
the federal government by transforming it from a decentralized state into a highly 
centralized, activist state). 
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deemed unconstitutional on state law grounds buttresses Farber’s 
view.68 
Third, the Constitution specifically enumerated the powers of 
the federal government, retaining all other rights of sovereignty to 
the individual states, as evidenced by the Tenth Amendment.  As 
James Madison noted in Federalist Paper No. 45, “The powers 
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government 
are few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and indefinite.”69 
Although the list of federal powers articulated in the 
Constitution appear impressive, in fact they are largely limited to 
addressing: (a) the creation of a common market with free 
movement of goods, peoples and services across state 
boundaries,70 much like the common market that exists in the 
European Union;71 and (b) the creation of a coherent, unified voice 
of the United States in its relations with other countries.72  
Although these two areas of federal jurisdiction embody many 
 
68 See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, The Kentucky Resolutions, Dec. 3, 1799 
(explaining that the state of Kentucky had constitutional authority to nullify an act 
of Congress, here the Alien and Sedition Act, on state law grounds.  This debate 
ultimately led to the South Carolina “nullification crisis” from 1828 to 1833.); see 
generally STANLY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800 (1995) (providing an analytical survey of political, 
economic, and military concerns as they related to federalism between 1788 and 
1800). 
69 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison). 
70 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. 
71 Part I, Article 2 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community states: 
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market 
and an economic and monetary union and by implementing common 
policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4, to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable 
development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of 
social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and 
non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and 
convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the 
standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion 
and solidarity among Member States. 
The Treaty Establishing the European Community, part I, art. 2, C 325/33 (Dec. 
24, 2002).   
72 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (holding that “in the case of 
all international compacts and agreements . . . complete power over international 
affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject to any 
curtailment or interference on the part of the several states.”) 
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aspects of national sovereignty, it is important to consider what the 
original, pre-Constitution document did not cover. 
Before the passage of the 14th Amendment in 1868, the federal 
government had virtually no power to regulate the manner in 
which a state treated its own citizens.73  States were largely free to 
treat their citizens however cruelly or arbitrarily as they wished as 
long as such laws did not affect the common market, foreign 
policy, or other limited areas of federal jurisdiction.  No state 
action better exemplifies this fact than the institution of slavery, 
which was practiced extensively by many states until the late 19th 
century.  These states enslaved their own inhabitants, despite the 
fact that slaves were eligible for citizenship in other states. 
Furthermore, no state was required to provide any of the rights 
contained in the federal Bill of Rights to its own citizens.74  In the 
past 300 years, there are no other instances in the histories of 
legally unified nations where a class of people enjoyed full 
citizenship in some jurisdictions but were enslaved in other 
jurisdictions. 
Before the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments to the US Constitution, which ended peonage and 
extended full citizenship and legal protections to former slaves, the 
United States practiced one of the most racially polarized systems 
of slavery ever promulgated.  The United States’ experience with 
slavery was not just unique to the western world, but arguably to 
world history generally.  As noted by the report of the Brown 
University Steering Committee on Slavery and Justice (hereinafter 
“Brown Report”): 
If American slavery has any claims to being historically 
“peculiar,” its peculiarity lay in its rigorous racialism, the 
systematic way in which racial ideas were used to demean 
and deny the humanity of people of even partial African 
descent. This historical legacy would make the process of 
incorporating the formerly enslaved as citizens far more 
 
73 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
74 See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (holding that the 
federal bill of rights did not apply to the states prior to the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.) 
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problematic in the United States than in other New World 
slave societies.75 
This helps to explain the historical distinction in racial attitudes 
between the United States and countries such as Brazil that had an 
even longer history of slavery than the United States.76  The United 
States was, perhaps, unique in the history of the world in its 
racialization of slavery.  As noted by the Brown Report: “Few if 
any societies in history carried this logic further than the United 
States, where people of African descent came to be regarded as a 
distinct ‘race’ of persons, fashioned by nature for hard labor.”77 
In other words, prior to the passage of the 14th Amendment, the 
U.S. federal government had less legal power to regulate human 
rights abuses by U.S. states against their citizens than international 
law has to regulate human rights abuses by nations against their 
own citizens.  In this respect, the American states enjoyed more 
sovereignty and autonomy from federal intervention than 
individual nations currently enjoy in the international legal system. 
The sovereign American states prior to the Civil War thus 
retained many of the attributes of what we would today normally 
consider independent states where sovereignty is regularly 
curtailed by certain supranational institutional rules affecting 
economics,78 taxation,79 labor, human and animal health,80 product 
safety, anti-trust and securities regulation, to name just a few. 
 
75 REPORT OF THE BROWN UNIVERSITY STEERING COMMITTEE ON SLAVERY AND 
JUSTICE, SLAVERY AND JUSTICE at 8, available at http://www.brown.edu/Research 
/Slavery_Justice/documents/SlaveryAndJustice.pdf [hereinafter BROWN REPORT]. 
76 See HERBERT S. KLEIN, AFRICAN SLAVERY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN 217–20 (1988) (explaining that the American system of slavery differed 
in several meaningful ways as compared to other North and South American 
countries). 
77 BROWN REPORT, supra note 75, at 8. 
78 See, e.g., Llewellyn H. Rockwell, WTO Foments a TradeWar, LUDWIG VAN 
MISES INSTITUTE, Jan. 21, 2002, http://mises.org/Article.aspx?Id=874&FS=WTO 
+Foments+A+Trade+War (Last visited Jan. 31, 2010) (indicating that, for example, 
the World Trade Organisation, for the purpose of creating an integrated world 
market, has had a tremendous impact on US law, requiring the US to modify a 
substantial number of its laws and regulation regarding the environment, 
taxation, product health and safety, and of course domestic rules regarding trade). 
79 Id. 
80 James D. Wilets, A Unified Theory of International Law, the State, and the 
Individual: Transnational Legal Harmonization in the Context of Economic and 
Legal Globalization (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Berkeley 
Electronic Press) (“Even sections of US domestic statutes protecting dolphins and 
sea turtles have been ruled violative of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
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Thus, at a minimum, the pre-Civil War, or “antebellum” states 
maintained much greater sovereignty over their domestic law than 
the member states of the supposedly non-federal contemporary 
European Union.  In this sense, the Antebellum United States 
resembled a confederation of truly sovereign, independent states 
much more than the current European Union.  This was reflected 
in much of the U.S. legal literature and legal reality of the period.  
For example, antebellum legal theorists such as Calhoun viewed 
the American union in terms that would currently be considered 
confederative, rather than federal.  These legal theorists took the 
10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and state sovereignty 
seriously, not just as a jingoistic assertion of anti-Northern 
sentiment, but as an expression of the original concept of American 
federalism: thirteen independent nations delegating certain limited 
powers to a central government and otherwise retaining the other 
attributes of state sovereignty.81 
However, even after the Civil War and the passage of the 14th 
Amendment, U.S. states still enjoyed certain kinds of sovereignty 
that even sovereign nations do not currently enjoy under 
international law.  Sovereignty normally implies the power to 
regulate the activity of individuals residing within the territory of 
the sovereign.  Nevertheless, the Constitution originally envisioned 
the several states as the primary regulators of individual activity, 
not the federal government, and this regulatory division continued 
even after the Civil War.82 
The inability of federal law to protect, or to regulate, the 
conduct of individuals, as opposed to respective states, is much 
more characteristic of traditional international law, not domestic 
law.  Indeed, the growth of international criminal law has 
shattered that fundamental distinction between international and 
domestic law. 
This division of power left the federal government unable to 
prevent creation by the states of a pervasive system of private 
segregation that would now be characterized as a violation of jus 
 
Trade, even though there has never been any allegation of any protectionist intent 
behind the passage of such acts.”). 
81 See Backer, supra note 45, at 178. 
82 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–8 (1995) (holding that while 
Congress has broad authority to enact laws through its constitutional powers, the 
states are the primary regulators of local, private conduct and are protected from 
undue federal encroachment). 
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cogens international law.83  Nevertheless, the division of powers 
between the federal and state governments left the federal 
government powerless to require states to eliminate the pervasive 
system of private segregation. 
The system of racial apartheid in southern U.S. states was 
unique to the industrialized world and, as of the early 1960’s, was 
officially practiced only in the outlaw nations of Rhodesia and 
South Africa.  Even two individuals of different races married in 
one state could be arrested in another state for the simple act of 
being married until 1967, hardly a legal characteristic of a country 
with one unified coherent domestic legal system.84  Indeed, the 
parents of President Barack Obama would have been arrested 
simply for being married had they chosen to visit any one of such 
sixteen U.S. states during the time of their marriage. 
The enormous advances in human rights protections in the 
United States that resulted from the elimination of American 
slavery and apartheid came not from a consensual political process 
within the United States, but from the fact that the values and 
mores of the North were imposed on the South through a violent 
strengthening of the federalist process.  Similarly, the end of 
apartheid in the United States came about only through a 
strengthening of the implied powers of federalism, piggybacking 
on the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which itself was 
intended only to create a common market, not to create a national 
civil rights law.85  The U.S. Supreme Court was forced to resort to 
the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and in some cases 
the Spending Clause,86 because no other Constitutional authority 
 
83 It is true that segregation was not limited to private actors after the Civil 
War, at least until Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny dismantled state-
sponsored segregation.  Nevertheless, the Fourteenth Amendment could have 
permitted federal prevention of state laws requiring segregation if the U.S. 
Supreme Court had viewed such laws as a violation of equal protection.  Thus, the 
existence of state segregation was not technically a lacuna in federal power, but 
the characterization of segregation itself by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
84 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that Virginia’s 
antimiscegenation law had no legitimate purpose other than invidious racial 
discrimination and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment). 
85 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (explaining that the 
Commerce Clause authorizes Congress with the legislative power to prohibit 
segregation in privately owned public accommodations). 
86 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 vests the federal government with the power to 
require states to take certain actions as a condition of receiving federal funds in 
areas where the federal government has no direct power under the Constitution 
to regulate the states or individuals.  In other words, the “Spending Clause” gives 
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existed for federal regulation of individual discrimination.  As 
discussed in the following paragraphs, the European Union’s 
central lawmaking authorities have had, in many cases, less 
difficulty in finding explicit or implicit authority in EU treaties for 
more far-reaching “federal legislation.” 
As in the EU, it was the creation of a unitary economic market, 
as provided by the Commerce Clause, which gave the U.S. federal 
government the implied power to regulate issues with only very 
attenuated relationships to interstate commerce.  The federal 
government’s exercise of implied power to regulate entities not 
explicitly subject to federal regulation occurred as the American 
market and economy became more national.87  Legal regulation of 
a wide variety of economic and social issues then moved from the 
state to the federal level.  A similar phenomenon is occurring at the 
international level.  Globalization is creating a unitary economic 
market and moving regulation from the national to the 
international level. 
3.4. The Implications of Economic and Legal Harmonization in the 
United States for Individual Political, Economic, Social and 
Human Rights 
As noted above, prior to the passage of the Civil War 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the United States practiced 
one of the most, if not the most, racialized systems of slavery ever 
promulgated.  Even after the passage of the Equal Protection 
Clause, many Southern states promulgated a system of racial 
apartheid unique to the industrialized world and, as of the early 
1960’s, officially practiced only in the outlaw nations of Rhodesia 
and South Africa.  The federalization of civil rights laws, originally 
only a concern of the individual states, brought the citizens of 
numerous states up to a minimum, albeit highly imperfect, 
standard of human rights protection, while permitting other states 
in the United States to grant their citizens even greater rights. 
 
the federal government the power to do indirectly what it does not have the 
power to do directly. 
87 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that Congress 
may regulate intrastate commerce if the local economic activity, in the aggregate, 
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce). 
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Similarly, the process of TLH can result in substantial increases 
in net individual rights, primarily by raising the floor of minimal 
human rights protections of the least protective jurisdictions.88 
4. A CASE STUDY OF TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL HARMONIZATION: 
THE “FEDERALIZATION” OF EUROPEAN LAW 
In 1956, Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, the six original members of the European Union 
(then known as the European Economic Community), signed the 
Treaty of Rome.  The Treaty, and its subsequent revisions, 
provided for the creation of a true common market with complete 
freedom of movement of goods, people, services and labor among 
the member nations, a European version of the U.S. Commerce 
Clause.89 
There is a relative dearth of literature on the parallel aspects of 
U.S. federalism and European integration in part because many 
legal and social commentators on both sides of the Atlantic resist 
any equivalency between the United States and Europe.  Scholars 
on both sides of the Atlantic tend to view federalism in the U.S. 
 
88 It must also be noted, however, that this process of guaranteeing 
individual rights and providing minimal environmental, labor and other 
standards was under considerable pressure in the United States during the Bush 
administration, and to some extent in the European Union as well.  For example, 
under the Bush administration, federal supremacy was used as a means of 
attacking the relatively more stringent environmental standards in California and 
other states, and as a means of preempting state law on issues related to same-sex 
marriage, drug regulation, abortion, euthanasia, and stem-cell research.  See, e.g., 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (defining “marriage” as “only a legal union between one man 
and one woman as husband and wife”); 28 U.S.C. § 1738c (2006) (stating that 
states and territories were not required to give effect to the public acts, records, or 
judicial proceedings of any other state or territory that recognized a same-sex 
relationship as a marriage).  Congress passed a statute that deprived all same-sex 
couples legally married in a U.S. state from receiving more than 1,000 federal 
benefits flowing from marriage.  Id.  Conversely, the conservative justices on the 
federal Supreme Court have invoked the limited power of the federal government 
in striking down several federal laws buttressing individual civil rights.  See, e.g., 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1996) (narrowly interpreting Congress’s 
power to enforce Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment).   
89 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 37, 44  (charging the Community with 
the task of implementing common policies to establish a common market and an 
economic and monetary union).  See also id. (“[A]n internal market characterised 
by the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of 
goods, person, services and capital . . . .”). 
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through the lens of domestic law,90 without recognizing the 
striking parallels between U.S. federalism and the process by 
which international law is created, although increasingly greater 
numbers of scholars have noted the parallels between the two 
phenomena.91  Legal harmonization in the European Union has 
been viewed, arguably incorrectly, as a sui generis phenomenon 
with no other parallels, but definitely much more a creation of 
traditional international law than the United States.92  They would 
argue that the European Union is a creation of specific treaties 
among fully independent and sovereign countries, as opposed to 
the U.S. Constitution, which supposedly was created organically 
from the “people.”93  As has been discussed previously, this 
distinction is more illusory than real in practice.  The creation and 
development of United States federalism arguably bears much 
more similarity to contemporary notions of international law than 
most commentators in the United States would currently admit.  
Similarly, many European commentators have also overlooked the 
similarities between the ostensibly international EU law and 
federal law in the United States.94 
The European Community law of the European Union shares 
the four core legal characterizations of U.S. domestic federal law. 
 
90 Part of the problem lies in the contemporary tendency to overlook the 
plain intent of the Constitutional framers to preserve many of the sovereign 
characteristics of the originally independent states of the United States.  Indeed, a 
number of Constitutional scholars have argued that it would be more accurate to 
characterize the U.S. Constitution as a treaty among independent countries, rather 
than a document originating solely with the American people as a unified whole.  
See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 45.  See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
316, 402 (1819) (noting Maryland’s law is inconsistent with the U.S. federal 
constitution).  
91 See, e.g., Backer, supra note 45, at 183–85 (discussing how John C. Calhoun’s 
theories of federalism in antebellum United States may represent a conceptual 
framework upon which non-national federal systems of government, like the EU, 
can be understood by comparing contemporary European federalism to the 
American federalist model post-1865). 
92 See MARTIN supra note 45, at 209–10.  
93 Id. at 180–81. 
94 Id. at n.21 (noting “Europeans dismiss the American experience as 
irrelevant because of a mistaken belief that the American Constitutional founders, 
and those who came after, shared a common view of the nature of a federal state 
and that the nature of federalism in the United States has remained substantially 
unchanged since 1789”) (citing Mackensie Stuart, Problems of the European 
Community Transatlantic Parallels, 36 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 183 (1987)). 
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First, EU law enjoys supremacy over individual EU Member 
State law, equivalent to U.S. federal supremacy over state law in 
those limited areas where the federal government has authority to 
legislate.95 
Second, as in U.S. federal law, much of European law, with the 
exception of directives, is directly effective in the domestic legal 
system of EU Member States without further action by EU Member 
States.96  There is an argument that some countries’ legal systems 
would consider the direct effect of European law to be consistent 
with the manner in which international law is treated by some 
countries.  However, even EU Member States that do not recognize 
the direct incorporation of international law into their domestic 
law nevertheless accept this principle in the context of the 
European legal system.97  Thus, this characteristic of EU law is also 
much more typical of a federal system than international law. 
Third, judicial review by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) 
of Member State judicial decisions for compliance with EU law is 
 
95 It should be noted that some EU states such as Italy and Germany dispute 
the supremacy of EU law over their constitutional law in theory, but have 
recognized the principle in practice.  See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 
[Federal Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974, 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (1974) (F.R.G.) 
(recognizing the supremacy of EC law so long as the provisions of Community law 
fulfill the requirements of the German Constitution); Corte cost., Dec. 27 1973, 
n.183, 2 C.M.L.R. 372 (1974) (stating that if European law violated the 
fundamental rights contained in the Italian constitution, the Court would not have 
applied the European law). 
96 See What Are EU Regulations?, http://ec.europa.eu/community_law 
/introduction/what_regulation_en.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2010) (“Regulations 
are the most direct form of EU law — as soon as they are passed, they have 
binding legal force throughout every Member State, on a par with national laws.  
National governments do not have to take action themselves to implement EU 
regulations.”).  It should be noted that EU regulations enjoy this status in 
European law, as opposed to EU directives which require each EU state to 
implement the goals and purposes of the directive.  C.f. What Are EU Directives?, 
http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/introduction/what_directive_en.htm (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2010) (“EU directives lay down certain end results that must be 
achieved in every Member State.  National authorities have to adapt their laws to 
meet these goals, but are free to decide how to do so.”). 
97 The United Kingdom, for example, has a dualist legal system whereby 
international law is normally not recognized as domestic law until Parliament 
passes a statute making it such.  Nevertheless, as a member of the European 
Union, the United Kingdom must, along with all other EU member nations, give 
full effect to EU law within its domestic law.  See also Yuval Shany, How Supreme is 
the Supreme Law of the Land? Comparative Analysis of the Influence of International 
Human Rights Treaties upon the Interpretation of Constitutional Texts by Domestic 
Courts, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 341 (2006) (arguing that international human rights 
law should be applied as an interpretative tool for informing domestic law). 
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actually even more stringent and comprehensive than federal 
judicial review of U.S. state law or judicial decisions. 98 
Fourth, the implied powers of the EU lawmaking bodies to 
legislate on matters not explicitly delegated to it by the EU treaties 
are, as discussed above, the aspects of U.S. federalism that 
ultimately enable the United States to forge what can now be 
considered a unified state. 99 
Not only does EU law share the core fundamental legal 
characteristics of U.S. federalism, EU treaty law codifies the four 
freedoms of the movement of people, goods, services and capital 
that are the legal equivalent of the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce 
Clause.  This is all the more significant since the Commerce Clause 
is one of the few areas wherein U.S. federal law can legally regulate 
the actions of individuals, as opposed to simply the several states. 
The European Union has thus witnessed a similar 
“federalization” of broad substantive areas of law as has the 
United States.  Aside from defense and foreign policy, admittedly 
substantial exceptions, it is difficult to see how European Union 
law differs from U.S. federal law in terms of its effect as domestic 
law.  Moreover, increasing areas of law and policy related to 
foreign policy and external relations are being “federalized” to the 
extent that: 1) many foreign policy issues are trade issues, which by 
definition must be dealt with at the EU, not national, level; 2) the 
freedom of movement of people, goods, capital and services within 
the European Union has meant that the relevant borders for issues 
related to business regulation, immigration, criminal control, 
 
98 For example, any court at any level in any EU national court system can 
refer an issue involving EU law directly to the ECJ for immediate adjudication of 
that EU legal issue for remand to the national court.  Moreover, after a national 
constitutional court has made a final ruling on an issue of EU law, the ECJ is 
required to review that national court decision for compliance with EU law.  See 
Treaty of Rome, supra note 64. 
99 See CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR 
FREEDOMS 216 (2007) (discussing the development of implied external powers to 
parallel the European community’s internal competence); MARTIN BARTLIK , THE 
IMPACT OF EU LAW ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION 62 
(2007) (analogizing U.S. powers under the implied-power theory to the EU 
context); PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 
90 (2008) (providing both the narrow and wide formulations of implied powers); 
Competences of the European Union, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/ 
industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/competencesoftheeuropeanunion.htm 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2010) (discussing the competences of the EU granted in 
treaties as well as through implied powers). 
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product safety, and public safety are usually the borders of the EU, 
not the borders of each EU state.100 
As the subsequent discussion illustrates, in many respects the 
evolution of European “federalism” has been even more dramatic 
than that of U.S. federalism.  The members of the European Union 
began the process as not just independent countries with different 
languages and vast cultural differences, but as historical 
adversaries with a vicious history of nationalist conflict.  It was 
almost inconceivable in 1945 that the countries of Western and 
Central Europe would, within a span of approximately 50 years, 
emerge as a unified common market with most physical borders 
eliminated.  For example, the Schengen Agreement, of which the 
great majority of EU countries are members, eliminates virtually all 
aspects of a physical border between member countries.101 
The European Union now enjoys a completely unified common 
market largely identical to the national economy of the United 
States.102  As in the United States, upon entry of a good in any 
European Union port, it becomes an EU domestic good and faces 
no internal obstacles or discrimination in its sale or distribution 
anywhere in the EU.  As a result of the Schengen Convention, most 
 
100 See, for example, Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 
June 1985 Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic, on the Gradual 
Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, June 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 84, which 
facilitates the free movement of people, goods and services between EU member 
countries by removing all internal border checks among the signatory countries, 
thus literally creating a single, external border.  See also the Treaty of Amsterdam 
Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing The 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C340) 1, 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf, 
which incorporated the Schengen policies into the EU’s legal and institutional 
framework as the Schengen acquis to create a common set of rules to govern cross-
border movement of EU citizens and immigration, to enhance security by 
enabling greater cooperation between customs, police and judicial officials of 
member countries and to establish the Schengen Information System designed to 
combat terrorism and organized crime by centralizing data for access by all 
member countries. 
101 See Press Release, Enlargement of the Schengen Area to be Completed: 
Border Controls to be Lifted at Airports on 30 March (Mar. 28, 2008), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/472 (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2010) (announcing the dismantling of air border controls as the 
final step to eliminating internal border controls within the EU). 
102 See generally Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, supra note 89 (establishing a common market and economic and 
monetary union to promote sustainable development and a high degree of 
competitiveness). 
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countries have now completely eliminated any type of border 
controls whatsoever, so that it is often not even apparent when a 
traveler leaves one EU country and enters another. 
However, in certain ways the federalization and unification of 
the European Union has gone further than that of the United 
States, at least domestically.  It is easier for lawyers to practice law 
in a different EU Member State than it is for U.S. lawyers to 
practice in different individual state jurisdictions.103  Unlike in the 
United States, students wishing to study in another EU state not 
only cannot be charged higher tuition than citizens of the other EU 
state, but they are also entitled to receive the same living stipends 
as students from the host country.104  In summary, the European 
Union frequently applies its principles of non-discrimination 
against individuals from other states,105 and the EU equivalent of 
the U.S. Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities clause,106 more 
rigorously than the United States.  The European Union even 
frequently applies Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome, embodying the 
EU common market principles of the four freedoms of movement, 
in a more rigorous and methodical fashion than do U.S. courts with 
respect to the U.S.’s own Commerce Clause.107 
 
103 See Roger J. Goebel, The Liberalization of Interstate Legal Practice in the 
European Union: Lessons For the United States?, 34 INT’L LAW. 307, 307–08 (2000) 
(comparing the laws governing lawyers in America with those in the European 
Union). 
104 Compare Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 441 (1973) (recognizing the right of 
state universities to charge preferential tuition rates) with Case C-293/83, Gravier 
v. Liege, 1985 E.C.R. 593, 593 (granting entitlements to students from a country 
other than the host country to the same minimum subsistence allowance provided 
by the host country) and Case 184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre Public D’Aide Sociale 
d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, 2001 E.C.R. 6193 (charging different fees to 
students of other Member States is discriminatory). 
105 The principle of non-discrimination based on nation of EU nationality is 
embodied in Article 12 of the Treaty of Rome and is roughly analogous to the 
manner in which the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause is applied to 
prevent discrimination based on residency.  See generally Treaty of Rome, supra 
note 64, at art. 12. 
106 The principle of European Union citizenship is embodied in Article 18, 
conferring rights roughly analogous to the U.S. Constitution’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.  See id. art. 18. 
107 Compare Case 302/86, Comm’n on the Eur. Cmtys. v. Denmark, 1988 
E.C.R. 4607 (prohibiting Denmark from imposing beverage container regulations) 
with Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 473–474 (1981) (permitting 
Minnesota to impose requirements that beverage containers be made of 
cardboard, a product significant in Minnesota manufacturing).  Differential 
tuition based on state residency is acceptable in the United States, but not in the 
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However, over the years it became increasingly apparent that 
the creation of a common market inevitably implicated much more 
than a unified economy.  The lack of borders between EU states 
meant that the only meaningful border was that between the EU 
itself and non-EU states.  Accordingly, immigration and asylum 
standards are in the process of being harmonized to prevent non-
EU individuals from immigrating to the most permissive EU states 
and then freely relocating elsewhere in the EU.108  Open borders 
have also meant that criminal regulation has had to be harmonized 
and coordinated.  Current extradition standards are not based on 
international law, but rather permit an arrest warrant or 
extradition for crimes that may not necessarily be illegal in the 
country from which the alleged criminal is sought, a deviation 
from the “double-criminality” requirement in extradition law.  In 
addition, environmental law has become increasingly 
“federalized” with environmental protection a central stated goal 
of the EU treaties.109 
It is, however, in the areas of civil, political, economic and 
social human rights that the European Union has most clearly 
demonstrated the connection between economic and legal 
harmonization exemplified by TLH and by U.S. federalism.  The 
jurisdiction of the EU’s European Court of Justice is technically 
limited to the law encompassed by the EU’s treaties.110  Until 
relatively recently, EU treaties have largely focused on issues 
relating to the creation of the common market and largely avoided 
addressing human rights issues, much like the original US 
Constitution before the creation of the Bill of Rights.  Human rights 
in the European Union, and in Europe in general, have been 
traditionally enforced by the European Court of Human Rights, 
 
European Union.  See generally Vlandis, 412 U.S. at 452–53; Case 293/83, Gravier v. 
Liege, 1985 E.C.R. 593. 
108 See European Commission, Immigration, Towards a Common European 
Union Immigration Policy, http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/immigration 
/fsj_immigration_intro_en.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2010) (reporting how 
immigration standards are becoming more unified across nations). 
109 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, supra note 89, art. 174. 
110 See Court of Justice of the European Union, Jurisdiction: The Various 
Types of Proceedings, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/ 
#competences (last visited Jan. 12, 2010) (defining the boundaries of European 
Court of Justice jurisprudence). 
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which has jurisdiction over all the member countries of the Council 
of Europe, encompassing almost all of the countries in Europe.111 
The governing treaty of the European Court of Human Rights 
is the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.112  The European Court of Human Rights is an 
enormously respected institution, and its decisions are almost 
universally recognized and enforced by the member states of the 
Council of Europe.  However, the EU treaties have increasingly 
begun incorporating greater human rights protections above and 
beyond those guaranteed by the European Convention, the role of 
the EU’s European Court of Justice as a guarantor of human rights 
has vastly increased.113  This has resulted in the European Union’s 
“federalization” of what were previously European international 
human rights norms.  Because the human rights criteria for entry 
into the European Union are much more stringent than for entry 
into the Council, and because the benefits of EU membership are so 
much more valuable than membership in the Council because of 
the attendant economic and other advantages, the European Union 
is arguably able to force all of its member states to comply with its 
more rigorous human rights norms.  With the admission of Russia 
into the Council of Europe, it has become more difficult for the 
Council of Europe to effectively enforce the norms in the European 
Convention, and more difficult to reach a consensus among the 
numerous and politically diverse members of the Council of 
Europe regarding what precisely those norms are.  In this sense, 
the European Court of Human Rights has begun looking less like 
the European Human Rights Supreme Court and is coming to 
resemble a more traditional international law court.114  This is 
 
111 See European Court of Human Rights, 50 Years of Activity: The European 
Court of Human Rights—Some Facts and Figures at 3, http://www.echr.coe.int 
/NR/rdonlyres/ACD46A0F-615A-48B9-89D6-8480AFCC29FD/0/ 
FactsAndFigures_EN.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) (recounting how the 
European Court on Human Rights functions and listing the breadth of 
participants). 
112 Id. at 3. 
113 See European Commission, Respecting Fundamental Rights While 
Ensuring Security and Justice in the European Union, http://ec.europa.eu/justice 
_home/fsj/rights/fsj_rights_intro_en.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) (noting that 
the best known tool for ensuring human rights is “the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights proclaimed by European Union leaders in December 2000”). 
114 See Judy Dempsey, Russia Most Concerned with Itself in the Battle for Human 
Rights, INT’L. HERALD TRIB., June 29, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2007/06/29/world/europe/29ihtletter30.1.6413527.html (recounting Russia’s 
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occurring even as the European Court of Justice, by increasingly 
ruling on human rights protections explicitly provided for or 
implied within the Treaty of Rome, has come to resemble the 
United States Supreme Court in the sense that its jurisdiction has 
come to cover the full ambit of what would normally be domestic 
law.115 
In this sense, the European Union has evolved from a common 
market into an entity that is perhaps potentially the most potent 
protector of individual human, economic and social rights the 
world has ever seen.  It has the possibility of surpassing even the 
Council of Europe as the most effective and comprehensive 
protector of basic human rights in the world. 
This position is likely controversial since most human rights 
commentators regard the Council of Europe and its European 
Court of Human Rights as the preeminent human rights regional 
body in the world.116  In fact, it could be argued that the European 
Union’s European Court of Justice is an even more potent example 
of such regional human rights protection as it addresses the 
increasingly broad human rights protections offered by the 
European Union treaties, which will only be increased by the final 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.117  The failure of most human 
rights theorists to recognize this reality reflects the classical and 
increasingly outdated dichotomy between international and 
domestic law.118  When international norms are incorporated into 
“federal law” such as European Union law, with much more direct, 
expansive and binding authority, than traditional international 
 
prior attempts to free itself of international supervision of its human rights 
practices). 
115 See, e.g., The Treaty of Lisbon Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.  The Treaty 
of Lisbon incorporated the EU Charter of Fundamental Freedoms into EU Law, 
making that far-reaching treaty binding on EU member states.  The Treaty of 
Lisbon also provided for the EU as a whole to become a party to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as opposed to 
previously where each EU member was party to the European Convention, but 
not the EU as a whole.  See generally, EUROPA, The Treaty at a Glance, 
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm (last visited on Jan. 14, 
2010.).  These steps are consistent with the European Union adopting an identity 
much more similar to a state than a league of countries. 
116 See Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving International Human Rights System, 
100 AM. J. INT’L L. 783, 793 (2006) (“[T]he European Court of Human Rights for all 
practical purposes has become Europe’s constitutional court in matters of civil 
and political rights.”). 
117 See, e.g., Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 115. 
118 See, e.g., Buergenthal, supra note 116. 
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bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights, that federal 
body has now arguably become a much more effective enforcer of 
human rights norms.  Similarly, the elimination of some of the 
most horrific human rights abuses (slavery and American 
apartheid) occurred not through application of international law 
using traditional international legal institutions, but through the 
forceful application of those norms using federal law.119 
As will be discussed later in this Article, this transformation of 
international law into federal law has been occurring at an 
accelerating rate in the European Union, and to a lesser extent in 
other regions of the world.  As this Article will explore, this 
transformative process from international law to “federal law” has 
profound implications for international implementation of 
individual protections and regulation of labor, the environment, 
and other substantive areas of the law normally associated with 
national law. 
5. OTHER EXAMPLES OF INCIPIENT TLH ON A REGIONAL AND 
NATIONAL LEVEL 
5.1  Regional Institutions 
In addition to the European Union, other regional associations 
such as NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ECOWAS and the African Union, 
are tentatively and still inadequately moving towards basing their 
economic relationships on mutual respect for certain fundamental 
human rights norms, particularly those human rights120 
encompassing labor rights and other social and economic rights.  
The forums in which regional standards are discussed can, 
arguably, produce a particularly valuable opportunity for NGOs 
and other societal actors to participate in development of these 
regional norms in a manner that is frequently not recognized in 
 
119 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV. 
120 See, e.g., MERCOSUR: A Space for Interaction, a Space for Integration, 
http://www.unesco.org/most/p80ext.htm (“Mercosur is much more than a 
commercial or investment phenomenon. It is a historical, cultural and political 
phenomenon, with vast ramifications in the Latin American and international 
scene.”).  See also id. (“In fact, many other actors and societal forces are becoming 
active at the regional level, such as scientific and university communities, social 
movements (feminism, environmentalism, indigenous peoples, human rights 
movements), non-governmental organisations of various sorts (such as those 
engaged in the promotion of active citizenship of federations of grassroots 
organisations).” 
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traditional political science or international law theories of norm 
development.  This regional dialogue in turn has a significant 
impact on the national policies of the member states.  It is a 
dialectical process of norm “feedback” that is the essence of TLH.  
These non-state actors arguably have much more influence in 
regional forums than in global forums.  This could result, in part, 
because personal and professional links that result from these 
forums can be maintained in order to produce a continuing 
dialogue for change.  This is more effective than global forums 
where the participants are much less likely to maintain consistent 
communication and dialogue.  Moreover, to the extent these 
forums are occurring in the context of economic regional 
associations, it is possible that the professional relationships 
among the participants are far more significant. 121   
NAFTA, through its labor side agreement,122 provides an 
admittedly weak—but historically novel—mechanism for labor 
unions or government bodies to bring complaints against another 
NAFTA member for violations of labor rights, many of which are 
now universally recognized human rights.123  The NAFTA 
Environmental Side Agreement provides for an analogous, 
although weaker, mechanism for environmental violations.124 
MERCOSUR has begun to implement association-wide labor, 
human rights, environmental and other standards not explicitly 
 
121 The observations in this paragraph are based on the Author’s firsthand 
participation in numerous international NGO forums within the context of 
MERCOSUR and in other regional and international contexts. 
122 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex, art. I, 
Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499. 
123 See generally Lance Compa, Going Multilateral: The Evolution of U.S. 
Hemispheric Labor Rights Policy under GSP and NAFTA, 10 CONN. J. INT’L L. 337, 339-
43 (1994) (discussing similar labor rights espoused by the International Labour 
Organization in foundational treaties of the EU, directive of the EU Commission, 
and the United States Generalized System of Preferences program). 
124 See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., art. 37, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (citing Article Five’s enforcement 
mechanisms, which are subject to Article 37’s stipulation that “[n]othing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to empower a Party’s authorities to take . . . 
enforcement activities in the territory of another Party”); Steve Charnovitz, The 
NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for Environmental Cooperation, 
Trade Policy, and American Treatymaking, 8 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 3, 6–9  (1994) 
(describing the various deficiencies of the Side Agreement’s enforcement 
mechanisms, e.g., international obligations based on domestic standards, excusing 
enforcement based on lack of resources, and resistance to employing sanctions). 
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related to trade among the countries.125  For example, MERCOSUR 
had taken measures addressing discrimination based on race,126 
ethnicity,127 gender,128 and sexual orientation129 on an association-
wide basis.  It is particularly notable that MERCOSUR took a joint 
position on evidence released regarding the cooperation among the 
military regimes of southern South America during the 1970s and 
1980s in the abduction and murder of political opponents of the 
military regimes of those six countries—the countries frequently 
referred to as the “Condor Group.”  Indeed, the South American 
press “has christened cooperation between the dictatorships “the 
 
125 Federico Luis Larrinaga, Argentina, A New U.S. Non-NATO Ally, 53 NAVAL 
WAR C. REV. (2000) (noting that the union of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uraguay 
and the United States has encouraged defense agreements between other 
countries to promote peacekeeping, environmental protection, and humanitarian 
relief). 
126 Sandra Polaski, Protecting Labor Rights Through Trade Agreements: An 
Analytical Guide, 10 U. C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y. 13, 16 (2003) (noting that in 
addition to protecting basic labor rights, MERCOSUR includes a right to “freedom 
from discrimination in employment based on race, gender, age or other 
characteristic”). 
127 Id. 
128 See, e.g., Regional Conference on Women in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Mar del Plata, Arg., Sept. 7–8, 2005, Report of the Thirty Eighth 
Meeting of the Presiding Officers of the Regional Conference on Women in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. LC/L.2430 (MDM. 38/4) (Dec. 2, 
2005), available at http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/3/24033/lcl2430i.pdf:  
In terms of achievements in the region, [the Chairperson of the Presiding 
Officers] mentioned the incorporation of the Council of Ministers for 
Women’s Affairs of Central America (COMMCA) into the Central 
American Integration System (SICA). She also referred to the 
development, growth and strengthening of the Mercosur specialized 
meetings on women (REM), stressing that it was important to 
consolidate the mechanisms that existed in the region, to guard against 
their impairment and to enhance their profile . . .  
See also INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, EQUALITY AT WORK: TACKLING THE CHALLENGES: 
GLOBAL REPORT UNDER THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE ILO DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES AND RIGHTS AT WORK 5, (2007) (discussing the tripartite commission). 
129 See Press Release, Int’l Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Comm’n, Latin 
America: First Hurdle for LGBT Rights Passed Within Latin American Union 
(Aug. 30, 2007) (on file with author) (detailing the human rights committee of the 
Southern Common Market issuance of a declaration to recognize and promote an 
end to discrimination against sexual and gender minorities by member countries); 
Press Release, Int’l Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Ass’n, Mercosur 
Countries and Associated States Commit Themselves to the Fight Against 
Homophobia (Sept. 29, 2006) (on file with author). 
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MERCOSUR of Terror.”130  In 2010, the African Union threatened  
Madagascar with economic and other sanctions if the government 
did not comply with a power-sharing agreement.131 
It would be reasonable to expect that as economic integration in 
MERCOSUR and other regional organizations progresses, social 
and political harmonization will follow as a means of reducing 
economic externalities with respect to investment decisions within 
the economic associations. 
5.2. Individual State Participation in TLH 
Quite apart from quasi-”federalism” and other kinds of 
regionalization, individual countries also participate in TLH 
through:  (1) national regulatory standards with extraterritorial 
effect; (2) incorporation of international legal standards into 
national law (“Domestic Incorporation”); (3) provision of domestic 
legal forums for enforcement of international law; and (4) creating 
unilateral conditions on foreign aid or other bilateral transactions. 
5.2.1. National Regulatory Standards with Extraterritorial Effect 
As discussed above, one jurisdiction can contribute to TLH 
simply by force of its domestic market.  Most global automakers 
feel compelled to comply with California emissions standards in 
order not to be foreclosed from its enormous market.132  China has 
been forced to address shortfalls in its product safety standards as 
a result of a public outcry in Europe and the United States and 
elsewhere over some of its dangerous products.133  The generally 
more rigorous regulatory climate of the European Union has 
earned the European Union a reputation as the “world’s 
 
130 Mario Osava, Latin America: The ‘Mercosur of Terror’ or Integrated Repression, 
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 10, 1999. 
131 David Clarke & Angus Swan, AU Gives Madagascar Leader Sanctions 
Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/reuters 
/2010/02/19/world/international-us-madagascar-crisis.html (last visited Feb. 22, 
2010). 
132 Ken Bensinger, Califonia Emission Waiver Looms for Carmakers, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 19, 2009, available at http://Articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/19/business/fi-
fueleconomy19?pg=1. 
133 See Jeremiah Marquez, China Will Look into Report of Cadmium in Children’s’ 
Jewelry, USA TODAY, Jan. 12, 2010, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news 
/health/2010-01-10-childrens-jewelry-probe_N.htm. 
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regulator.”134  As long as such product or other regulations are 
based on objective and scientifically based standards, and do not 
arbitrarily restrict trade or constitute disguised restrictions on 
international trade, they are not foreclosed by the World Trade 
Organization’s prohibition of quantitative restrictions on trade.135 
5.2.2. Domestic Incorporation 
When a country incorporates international legal norms into its 
domestic law, it is, by definition, harmonizing its law with that of 
the international community.  Examples include national 
constitutional provisions, such as those of The Netherlands, that 
provide that international law shall have automatic domestic 
effect, and in some cases, shall be supreme to national law or even 
the nation’s constitution.136  The United Kingdom, one of the most 
resistant countries to domestic incorporation of international law, 
has incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into 
British law, giving individuals the right to bring a suit in any 
British court based on the Convention, the same as with any other 
British law.137  Article VI of the United States Constitution gives 
direct effect and supremacy to international treaties, although the 
judicially created doctrine of “non-self-execution” has limited 
domestic incorporation of international law in practice.  It is thus 
easy to see why many Europeans would view the supremacy of EU 
law as consistent with international law and not a type of federal 
law. 
5.2.3. Domestic Legal Forums for Enforcement of International 
Standards 
Many countries recognize the ability of individuals to enforce 
international legal norms, even in disputes among non-domestic 
 
134 Brussels Rules OK: How the European Union Is becoming the World's Chief 
Regulator, ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 2007, at 66. 
135 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (detailing the general exceptions to the obligations under the 
agreement). 
136 Rett R. Ludwikowski, Supreme Law or Basic Law?  The Decline of the Concept 
of Constitutional Supremacy, 9 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 253, 280 (2001) 
(explaining that in the Netherlands the constitution resolves a conflict between a 
treaty and the constitution so that the treaty may prevail if this result was 
approved by the vote of two-thirds of the Parliament, the number of votes needed 
to amend the constitution). 
137 Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 2 (U.K.). 
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entities.  For example, in the United States, the Alien Tort Claims 
Act (“ATCA”) permits an alien to bring a lawsuit against another 
alien, as well as against U.S. defendants, for violation of customary 
international law.138  The ATCA has also been used against 
multinational corporations that have been alleged to violate 
international law.139  It is clear that the ATCA has become the focus 
of enormous opposition from many in the U.S. business 
community.140  
Belgium provided competence to its national courts to hear 
cases against non-Belgium nationals for violations of international 
criminal law, even for cases that had no factual connection to 
Belgium.141  Essentially, the Belgium national courts were serving 
as a nationally operated International Criminal Court.  Under 
pressure from the United States, Belgium changed its laws limit its 
courts’ competence to cases involving a nexus with Belgium.  
Nevertheless, principles of universal jurisdiction and some 
international treaties grant the same ability to any national court to 
potentially exercise the same kind of jurisdiction.  In the Pinochet 
case, the UK’s House of Lords ruled that the United Kingdom had 
personal jurisdiction over former Chilean President Pinochet under 
the Convention against Torture in order to extradite him to Spain 
in order to stand trial for crimes against humanity.142  It is not 
necessary under universal jurisdiction or the European Convention 
 
138 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
139 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (residents of 
Papua New Guinea allowed to bring claim against mining corporation in U.S. 
courts under ATCA); Doe I v. Unocal Corporation, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). 
140 See Demian Betz, Note, Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible for 
Human Rights Abuses Committed by Security Forces in Conflict-Ridden Nations: An 
Argument Against Exporting Federal Jurisdiction for the Purpose of Regulating 
Corporate Behavior Abroad, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 163 (2001) (critiquing imposing 
liability on U.S. companies through the ATCA); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The 
Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 457, 460 (2001) (“The 
most significant cost of international human rights litigation is that it shifts 
responsibility for official condemnation and sanction of foreign governments 
away from elected political officials to private plaintiffs and their 
representatives.”). 
141 See Ian Black, Belgium Asserts Right to Try Sharon, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 13, 
2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/13/israel (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2010) (discussing the amendment of Belgium’s “universal 
jurisdiction” law and its application to former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon). 
142 R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
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on Human Rights to demonstrate a nexus between the defendant 
and his or her actions, and the forum country. 
In 2009, Spain continued to pursue indictment of six high level 
Bush Administration officials for violations of international 
criminal law143 and the United States prosecuted Chuckie Taylor, 
the son of deposed Liberian President Charles Taylor for violations 
of the Convention against Torture in Liberia.144 
The significance of these prosecutions in domestic courts of 
individuals for violations of international law cannot be overstated.  
To the extent the defendants are being prosecuted, or are being 
subject to civil suit, for violations of international law committed 
abroad, national courts are essentially taking on the functions of 
international courts.  There are few more dramatic examples of the 
implementation of TLH than national courts applying international 
treaties or common principles of international criminal law against 
these defendants. 
5.2.4. Unilateral Conditions on Foreign Aid or Other Bilateral 
Transactions 
Many countries impose certain human rights, labor, 
environmental, and other conditions on their assistance to other 
countries.  The United States, for example, requires that any 
country receiving unilateral tariff benefits extended by the United 
States to lesser developed countries must comply with 
“international labor standards.”145  The United States imposes 
similar standards for other types of foreign assistance. 
It is a thesis of this Article that such conditionality can, in some 
circumstances, provide powerful incentives for the largest 
economic and political actors in those foreign countries to comply 
with these norms by harmonizing their national law, thus 
effectuating TLH. 
 
143 Julian Borger & Dale Fuchs, Spanish Judge to Hear Torture Case Against Six 
Bush Officials, OBSERVER, Mar. 29, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009 
/mar/29/guantanamo-bay-torture-inquiry. 
144 Carmen Gentile, Son of Ex-President of Liberia Gets 97-Year Prison Sentence, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2009, at A14. 
145 It should be noted, however, that the “international labor standards” 
referenced by U.S. law, are essentially U.S. formulated norms, not actually 
international norms. 
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6. THE POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS 
AS PARTICIPANTS IN TLH:  THE WTO, THE UN AND OTHER GLOBAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
6.1. The World Trade Organization 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the two 
principal global governance body and, as discussed below, its 
substantive jurisdiction is complementary to that of the United 
Nations (UN).  Whereas the UN has jurisdiction over any issue that 
may come before it, the WTO’s jurisdiction has been strictly limited 
to issues involving trade.146  Although the WTO’s substantive 
jurisdiction is more restrictive than that of the UN, the WTO 
arguably has the potential to play a much more effective role in 
TLH.  Indeed, this Article will argue that the WTO, in many 
respects bears several characteristics of a quasi-federal institution 
while remaining a quintessentially intergovernmental institution. 
This idea is not as overreaching as it may first appear.  As 
discussed earlier in this Article, the process of federalism was, to a 
great extent, grounded in a process of regional economic 
globalization.  As barriers to the free movement of people, goods, 
services and capital were removed, and entities such as the 
European Union and the United States realized that those four 
factors of economic activity implicated, to some extent, the 
majority of domestic law.  To the extent the WTO’s goal is to 
replicate regional economic globalization on a truly global level, 
the same logical tension between globalization and national law 
would appear to be present.  This tension presumably expresses 
itself in the forms of TLH already discussed in this Article that are 
occurring outside the WTO framework.  This tension may also 
need to be resolved within the WTO itself. 
The WTO, like most international institutions, makes rules that 
are binding on more than one state.  What distinguishes the WTO 
and its substantive law from other international law and 
institutions is the scope of the WTO’s lawmaking power.147  
 
146 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. II, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement 
or WTO Agreement]. 
147 The WTO has, for example, assumed jurisdiction over such diverse subject 
areas as: taxation, intellectual property, foreign investment, most kinds of 
services, government procurement, benefits to developing nations, agriculture, 
product “dumping,” customs valuation, safety measures for protection of a 
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Normally, traditional international law is created on an issue by 
issue basis through specific treaties or by the evolution of a specific 
customary international law norm.  As we saw in the creation of 
the United States and the European Union, the member states did 
not just create agreements among themselves regarding certain 
issues; they delegated decisionmaking power to a central authority 
with jurisdiction over a wide variety of substantive areas, and gave 
that central power the implied authority to go beyond the explicit 
grant of power in the founding documents.  Thus, it can be argued 
that WTO members have such an important investment in WTO 
membership, and that membership is critical to their economic 
functioning, that they sign up for the entire package, even if they 
disagree with specific rulings or rules promulgated by the WTO.  
As this Article posits, the United States and EU states made the 
same kind of bargain when they entered their union. 
WTO member states delegate to the WTO broad 
decisionmaking and rulemaking authority over a vast array of 
issues relating to trade, investment, intellectual property, and a 
myriad of other trade and economically related issues.148  Even 
though the WTO’s substantive jurisdiction is presumably strictly 
limited to issues directly related to trade, WTO judgments 
involving trade have also necessarily implicated and sometimes 
overturned countries’ environmental, intellectual property, 
investment, and other policies normally considered domestic in 
character.  The World Trade Organization thus exhibits many of 
the characteristics of U.S. and European federalism, even if on a 
less expansive scale. 
It would seem appropriate for the WTO to assume a greater 
role in global governance since it is in a unique position to tie trade 
to compliance with human rights, environmental, and other norms.  
It can be argued that it is unfair to have the WTO promote and 
enforce free trade without regulating the abuses that can 
accompany unlimited free trade.  The WTO is theoretically well-
equipped to assume this role for at least four reasons. 
First, the WTO is able to enforce its judgments in a way that the 
UN cannot.  WTO judgments involve substantial economic 
consequences to the violators of its norms, sometimes involving 
denial of trade benefits amounting to millions and sometimes 
 
country’s citizens against disease or other unhealthy products, etc.  General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
148 See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 146, art. II. 
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billions of dollars.  Conversely, the United Nations does not have a 
mechanism in place to force countries to comply with its rulings 
short of extreme sanctions in particularly egregious and rare 
circumstances. 
Second, because membership in the WTO entails enormous 
benefits, the incentive for countries to agree to be subject to the 
WTO’s strong enforcement mechanisms is tremendous.  One of the 
reasons the WTO enjoys global compliance with its norms in 
comparison with the UN is because the WTO produces tangible 
benefits for economic actors that are the principal political actors in 
the vast majority of countries.  Unfortunately, there are not 
extensive or powerful human rights lobbies in the great majority of 
countries, and human protection issues do not affect peoples’ 
material interests in the way that WTO membership does. 
Third, although the WTO’s jurisdiction is limited to trade, the 
WTO’s requirements of “fair competition” and economic 
transparency have had an impact on member countries’ domestic 
law.149  The requirements of fair competition and transparency 
does, however provide an opportunity for even greater domestic 
legal changes as the requirements of free trade require that 
countries be transparent to meet WTO minimum legal 
requirements, and countries’ failure to fully comply with these 
requirements cannot be indefinite. 
Fourth, it can be argued that environmental issues, economic 
regulation generally, and human rights issues (particularly labor 
rights issues), are in fact rationally related to trade.  It follows from 
this argument that a company that takes advantage of weak labor, 
environmental, or safety standards in less protective countries and 
then sells its products in countries that have higher levels of 
protection enjoys an arguably unfair trade advantage.150  It also 
 
149 Particularly in the area of subsidies, WTO rulings have required 
numerous countries to significantly modify their domestic economic policies that 
create an unfair advantage for their national companies over foreign competitors. 
See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 146, art. XVI, par. 4 (“Each member shall 
ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with 
its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements”); see also RAJ BHALA, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW HANDBOOK 14–18 (2001) (listing the trade-related 
statutes in U.S. law); DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 2 (2008) (“In many 
cases, these national laws are the domestic implementation of WTO Obligations”).  
150 See, e.g., Lance Compa, Going Multilateral: The Evolution of U.S. Hemispheric 
Labor Rights Policy under GSP and NAFTA, 10 CONN. J. INT’L L. 337, 338 (1995) 
(arguing that labor rights and international trade are linked as “[t]he neat division 
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undermines those standards for human protection in the more 
protective country by creating a powerful economic argument for 
lowering standards in those more protective countries.  Labor 
unions obviously recognize this, and have begun to mobilize 
internationally.  Their motive does not come principally out of 
concern for their brethren in other countries, but rather because 
they realize that raising international labor norms protects the 
norms in their own countries.151 
As discussed below, however, the WTO’s failure to tie free 
trade to these other related issues has been the greatest problem in 
effective TLH with respect to these issues.  This Article will present 
the reasons why the WTO has failed to live up to its potential, and 
suggest how TLH can help resolve this problem. 
6.2. The WTO’s Limitations as an Agent of TLH 
Despite some similarities between the WTO and federal 
structures, it would be inappropriate to characterize the WTO as 
even a quasi-federal structure.  The implied powers of the WTO to 
make rules, although vast with respect to international commerce, 
are strictly circumscribed to only issues directly related to trade.152  
The discussion below will illustrate why the WTO has been 
reluctant to take on a scope of substantive competence beyond the 
competence over trade issues it currently has. 
It can be argued that if the WTO were to tie trade issues with 
human rights, environmental, and labor issues, it could not 
perform its central function for at least three reasons. 
 
between commercial and social aspects of trade has evaporated under the 
wrenching pressure of new forces in a globalized economy and its shifting 
patterns of investment and disinvestment”). 
151 See, e.g., Ronaldo Munck, Globalization and Democracy: A New “Great 
Transformation”?, 581 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 10, 14–15 (2002): 
[I]t is now widely recognized that the impact of globalization on workers 
worldwide has brought about a profound process of rethinking and 
reorganizing within labor on a global scale, with even the once remote 
and conservative International Congress of Free Trade Unions 
advocating such radical measures as a global social movement unionism 
to counter capitalist globalization. Labor is not everywhere in retreat, 
and workers’ rights, though undercut by neoliberalism, are continuously 
and vigorously fought for across the world.  
(citation omitted). 
152 See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 146, art. II. 
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First, by definition, the WTO is predicated upon the 
participation of the vast majority of the world’s countries.  If the 
WTO undertook the function of enforcing norms not directly 
related to trade through sanctions, it would run the risk of having a 
large number of the world’s countries leave the WTO.  The WTO’s 
power lies precisely in its ability to impose rules without countries 
abandoning the system. 
Second, human protection norms encompassing 
environmental, labor, and human rights are highly subjective.  A 
country may be viewed by some countries as a serious human 
rights violator deserving of economic or other sanctions, while 
other countries may disagree.  For example, the United States 
attempted to impose economic sanctions on foreign companies 
doing business in Cuba in provisions of the Helms-Burton Act.  
The United States has agreed not to enforce those provisions under 
threat of WTO sanctions since those provisions would essentially 
require foreign companies to observe a trade embargo against 
Cuba when no other country has such restrictions.153  In other 
words, there may be dispute over whether an action by a particular 
country is in fact a violation of human rights norms.  Even if there 
is consensus on the existence of such violations, there may be a 
dispute over what is the appropriate action to be taken in the face 
of such violations. 
Third, if the WTO did explicitly tie trade benefits to human 
protection norms, it would become a de facto United Nations since 
it would be obligated to define the norms that it would enforce 
through trade sanctions, requiring the same negotiation among 
very diverse countries that limits the United Nations.  Moreover, 
such negotiation would probably result in an even lower level of 
norm creation than that which exists now since the penalties for 
non-compliance would be so much more severe. 
6.3. TLH as a Solution to the WTO Impasse 
Despite the inherent limitations of the WTO, it is important to 
recognize that real opportunities may exist for synergy between 
the WTO and TLH in effectuating compliance with human 
protection norms. 
 
153 See generally Stefaan Smis and Kim Van der Borght, The EU-U.S. 
Compromise on the Helms-Burton and D’Amato Acts, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 227 (1999) 
(describing the back and forth between the United States and European Union 
with regard to U.S. policy toward Cuba). 
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The WTO will not generally enforce a trade rule that conflicts 
with independently created international law, even if that 
particular norm is recognized in a treaty signed by a limited 
number of nations, as long as it is not otherwise arbitrary or a 
disguised restriction on trade.154  For example, WTO rules normally 
prohibit quantitative limitations on imports.  It has, however, 
allowed countries to do so in compliance with the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES).  This potential conflict has been the source of much 
legal commentary and concern among environmentalists.155  Thus, 
although the WTO does not itself formulate human and 
environmental norms it may take into account norms produced by 
TLH or other forms of international law in determining whether an 
environmentally based trade restriction measure violates WTO 
 
154 See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International 
Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 903, 904–05 (2004): 
For example, when the US agrees to a WTO treaty one day, and the next 
day it agrees to an MEA [Multilateral Environmental Agreement], the US 
acts as one and the same state (even though it does so in different fora). 
The WTO should not be used as a trade-only safe haven to circumvent 
MEA obligations that are, in principle, of equally-binding force between 
WTO members that are also party to the MEA. 
(Alteration in the original).   
155 See Shannon Hudnall, Towards a Greener International Trade System: 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the World Trade Organization, 29 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 175, 182 (1996) (asserting that world trade regulation must 
include environmental concerns as one of its objectives); Claire R. Kelly, The Value 
Vacuum: Self-Enforcing Regimes and the Dilution of the Normative Feedback Loop, 22 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 673, 719–20 (2001) (recognizing the North American Free Trade 
Agreement for incorporating environmental concerns into a side agreement, but 
emphasizing the limited nature of their enforceability); David Palmeter & Petros 
C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT’L. L. 398, 412 
(1998) (acknowledging that international agreements may alter the legal 
obligations of WTO member states); Wen-chen Shih, Conflicting Jurisdictions over 
Disputes Arising from the Application of Trade-Related Environmental Measures, 8 
RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 351, 387–88 (2009) (identifying a potential source of 
conflict where the WTO and the enforcement mechanism of multilateral 
environmental agreements would solve the same dispute in different ways); Chris 
Wold, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT: Conflict and Resolution?, 
26 ENVTL. L. 841, 919–21 (1996) (concluding that WTO policies and multilateral 
environmental agreements are fundamentally at odds with each other because the 
former seeks to open trade while the latter are enforced through trade 
restrictions); Elizabeth Granadillo, Note, Regulation of the International Trade of 
Endangered Species by the World Trade Organization, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & 
ECON. 437, 453–57 (2000) (identifying several points of tension between WTO 
regulation and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species) 
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rules.  There is still ambiguity about the precise hierarchy of such 
conflicting rules.156 
Thus, there is arguably the possibility that countries will tie 
trade benefits to independently created international norms, even 
if such norms are not adopted by a majority of the world’s 
countries, as long as such norms are not arbitrary or disguised 
restrictions on trade.157  This could provide an opportunity for 
trade unions in developed countries to push for implementation of 
a global or near-global minimum wage or other labor protections.  
Countries could then tie trade advantages to compliance with these 
international standards without violating WTO rules.  This linkage 
has been a source of tremendous political debate with respect to 
the free trade agreements that the United States has signed with 
various Latin American countries.  Ultimately, the argument can be 
made that it is not the WTO that has prevented such linkages but 
rather domestic politics in the relevant countries.158 
WTO member countries are unlikely to adopt such linkages in 
the policies of the WTO by themselves because of the enormous 
political, economic, and social diversity that characterizes the 
membership.  Because of this diversity, the problem of the lowest 
common denominator makes such linkages within the WTO 
problematic. 
Nevertheless, it is a thesis of this Article that TLH allows 
groupings of countries to implement norms that effectively bind 
 
156 See Wold, supra note 155, at 917–18 (characterizing the dispute as one 
addressing both who defines the criteria to evaluate environmental concerns, as 
well as who may legitimately apply it). 
157 See Shih, supra note 155, at 357 (citing current examples of trade-related 
environmental measures). 
158 See Christian Brandt, Laboring Toward Equality: NAFTA’s Effects and 
CAFTA’s Widsdom, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 77, 92–95 (2005) (attributing the 
bulk of CAFTA objections to those addressing labor provisions); Marianne Hogan, 
DR-CAFTA Prescribes a Poison Pill: Remedying the Inadequacies of Dominican 
Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement Labor Provisions, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 511, 532–36 (2006) (arguing that CAFTA does not provide incentives to 
improve labor standards and outlining improvements for the future); Lyndsay D. 
Speece, Comment, Beyond Borders: CAFTA’s Role in Shaping Labor Standards in Free 
Trade Agreements, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 1101, 1124 (2007) (suggesting that labor 
standard enforcement mechanisms found in the United States’ Free Trade 
Agreement with Jordan be incorporated into CAFTA to make the agreement more 
effective); Brandie Ballard Wade, CAFTA-DR Labor Provisions: Why They Fail 
Workers and Provide Dangerous Precedent for the FTAA, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 645, 
677 (2007) (concluding that the failures of CAFTA to improve labor standards 
should not be repeated in other free trade agreements negotiated by the United 
States). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/3
2010] TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL GLOBALIZATION 811 
 
non-participating countries by creating rules of trade that have to 
be followed by all countries wishing to trade with that particular 
grouping of countries.  The elegance of TLH is that it permits 
shifting coalitions of countries or other interest groups to 
implement such norms, creating a “ratcheting up” of protective 
international norms. 
6.4. The United Nations 
The United Nations and its affiliated institutions are one of the 
principal institutions of global governance, particularly with 
respect to issues of human rights and international security.159  The 
United Nations system remains the only truly global body with an 
unrestricted mandate to develop and implement international law.  
Nevertheless, cognizant of its global role as a representative body 
of liberal and illiberal states, it has simultaneously adopted a 
procedurally statist approach with considerable deference towards 
state sovereignty and a strong bias against coercive intervention.160  
Accordingly, consistent with its normative embrace of human 
rights, the United Nations’ bodies have frequently condemned 
human rights abuses in member nations, but have only 
infrequently authorized coercive intervention in response to those 
violations with economic sanctions161 or military force.162 
 
159 See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1, para. 3 (articulating the four main 
purposes of the United Nations, including “[t]o maintain international peace and 
security” and “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights”). 
160 The Charter of the United Nations articulates a clear commitment to 
respect state sovereignty: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
VII [Actions with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, 
and Acts of Aggression]. 
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.  To the extent violations of the human rights of a 
country’s people constitutes a “threat to the peace” intervention may be permitted 
under the Charter of the United Nations.  U.N. Charter art. 39. 
161 Examples of such intervention include the authorization of economic 
sanctions and an arms embargo against Rhodesia and South Africa.  As noted by 
Louis Sohn: 
Apartheid in South Africa became transformed through interpretations 
of United Nations law from a social evil, to a repugnant practice, to a 
crime under international law, to a threat to the peace that must not be 
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It is this gap between the normative human rights framework 
of the United Nations, and its inability or unwillingness to enforce 
these rights in a more assertive manner which has provided the 
justification and need for regional human rights and security 
bodies.  It is a central thesis of this Article that many regional 
bodies with the ability or potential to advance human rights norms 
and other issues are originally based on economic foundations.  
They have expanded their jurisdiction to encompass human rights 
and other issues as they have realized that true economic 
integration is difficult or impossible without harmonization of 
indirectly related legal norms.163 
There are numerous benefits of TLH as a complementary, non-
coercive, organic, and frequently more effective means of 
advancing human rights and other goals of international well-
being. 
First, TLH avoids the problem of international norm creation 
and enforcement being subject to the lowest common denominator.  
The United Nations, as an institution composed of the world’s 
nations, is hindered in developing norms that many of its member 
states do not recognize in their own legal systems.  To the extent it 
serves as a human rights enforcement mechanism for the world 
community (except those few countries that have been expelled for 
particularly egregious human rights abuses or threats to the peace), 
its enforcement mechanisms and norms are necessarily subject to a 
much “lower” common denominator.  To the extent the United 
Nations has, in fact, developed international legal norms that many 
of its members do not observe,164 it is unable to enforce those 
 
tolerated by the international community and which warranted the 
imposition of mandatory economic sanctions against the deviant 
government. 
Louis B. Sohn, The UN System as Authoritative Interpreter of Its Law, in 1 UNITED 
NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 169, 228 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 
1995). 
162 Examples of such intervention include Security Council authorization of 
military intervention in Haiti and the Serbian province of Kosovo. 
163 See supra Sections 2–5. 
164 For example, every member of the United Nations is obligated to respect 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, either because it is incorporated into 
the UN Charter or because many of its provisions have become part of customary 
international law.  See, e.g., Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(identifying the prohibition of torture as an element of international customary 
law, as evidenced by its inclusion in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).  
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norms. The development of legal norms in TLH, on the other hand, 
is aided by the ability of smaller groups of countries or other 
entities agreeing on a common set of norms, permitting the 
greatest possible promulgation and enforcement of human 
protections within any grouping of countries. 
In terms of enforcement, the only way the United Nations 
could truly “enforce” its relatively modest “floor” of human rights 
protections is to expel those countries that refuse to comply.  The 
problem with this mode of enforcement is that it destroys one of 
the most important functions of the United Nations as a global 
body with an almost universal membership.  This is not to say that 
the system should not constantly strive to strengthen its 
enforcement mechanisms and norms, but rather that it is 
necessarily limited by the extraordinarily diverse constituency it 
serves. 
Some international law commentators have advocated the 
articulation of a universal set of human rights standards applicable 
to all countries and denying participation in the international 
community to those countries that fail to fulfill those global 
standards.165  It certainly may be appropriate to expel certain 
countries from the United Nations that engage in systematic and 
severe human rights violations. Though, but for the “all-or-
nothing” approach to mean anything other than the system that is 
already in place, a substantially greater number of countries would 
have to be expelled from the United Nations.  A truly useful 
institution for world dialogue among vastly different countries 
would then lose much of its original purpose.  Another problem 
with the all-or-nothing approach is that it does not address what 
system of human rights protection, or even world order, would 
have to exist to regulate the conduct of those countries that do not 
comply with those global standards, but are short of constituting 
true international “outlaws.”  These all-or-nothing legal 
commentators likely underestimate the importance of maintaining 
a system of global relations, which permits liberal and illiberal 
countries to coexist peacefully and maintain communication 
 
Moreover, numerous countries are signatories to the ICCPR and other UN 
conventions while clearly in non-compliance with the treaties’ provisions. 
165 See, e.g., FERNANDO R. TESÓN, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 
(1998) (arguing that states must “respect human rights as a precondition for 
joining the international community” because international law can only be based 
upon an alliance of states that respect the human rights of their own citizens). 
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through dialogue.  In other words, even assuming the underlying 
normative assumptions these advocates must assume, the all-or-
nothing approach still leaves unanswered the question of what the 
international community’s strategy should be with respect to those 
countries that are not eligible to join the international community.  
Those countries that are ineligible will continue to exist, and unless 
a system of international relations provides rules that allow all of 
the countries of the world to coexist, the potential for conflict can 
only rise. 
TLH, on the other hand, arguably serves as a valid alternative 
to the all-or-nothing approach.  The theory promotes using higher 
standards of human protection than can be utilized on the UN 
floor, while still allowing the UN to use its weak enforcement 
mechanisms on those countries that would tolerate nothing 
more.166  There are examples of associations of states formed 
independently of the United Nations that address human rights 
violations outside the borders of their member states.  Such 
examples include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO)167 and the Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG),168 the latter of which militarily 
intervened in the Liberian and Sierra Leone Civil Wars.169  
Nevertheless, NATO’s belated intervention in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, its delayed threat of military intervention in Kosovo, 
and the willingness of the alliance to negotiate with Slobodan 
Milosevic illustrates the limitations of such efforts. 
 
166 See James D. Wilets, Lessons from Kosovo: Towards a Multiple Track System of 
Human Rights Protection, 6 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 645, 649–651 (2000) (discussing 
the advantages of using regional human rights systems to avoid the “all-or-
nothing” approach that a monolithic, unipolar form of human rights enforcement 
would engender). 
167 See generally North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Homepage, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2010) 
(describing the history and function of NATO). 
168 ECOMOG is the military arm of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS).  See generally Economic Community of West African 
States ECOWAS Homepage, http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id 
=about_a&lang=en (last visited Jan. 23, 2010) (describing the history and function 
of ECOWAS and ECOMOG). 
169 See Profile: Ecomog, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa 
/country_profiles/2364029.stm (2004) (last visited Jan. 23, 2010) (“The bloody civil 
war in Liberia prompted the Economic Community of West African States 
(Ecowas) to set up an armed Monitoring Group—Ecomog for short—in 1990.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/3
2010] TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL GLOBALIZATION 815 
 
Second, TLH is an organic process, relying on a web of mutual 
benefits and incentives for compliance with common rules.  Thus, 
TLH contains disincentives with varying degrees of effectiveness, 
for member countries to deviate from their harmonized norms.  
The use of economic integration, which is at the heart of TLH, 
could provide a clear economic incentive for members of regional 
groupings not to stray from international norms developed 
through TLH. 
Third, because TLH accounts for a deeper integration of the 
human protection norms existing in the participating countries, it 
helps to dialectically protect the domestic system of human rights 
support in those countries.  Its international norms will arguably 
only contribute to domestic justice as long as countries are willing 
to recognize the authority of those norms in their domestic legal 
system.  This Article posits that this willingness to recognize 
international norms is much more likely to occur as a result of TLH 
than when imposed by an international institution from above. 
Finally, the process of creating and enforcing a norm of human 
rights protection is most effective when done in a synergistic and 
dialectical manner between TLH and the UN.  Just because the 
United Nations is limited in its ability to enforce the norms it 
creates does not mean that the norms serve little or no purpose.  It 
is thus possible that the creation of ostensibly non-enforceable 
norms leads to practical enforcement by other entities 
independently of the UN through the process of TLH.170  In order 
for TLH to develop normative standards recognized by the 
participants in TLH, it is helpful to have internationally recognized 
human protection standards with which to begin.  Moreover, many 
international law norms have been used in litigation against 
companies that perpetuate the countries’ human rights violations, 
including severe labor rights violations.171  After all, it can be 
argued that in most countries more people are affected personally 
by work related human rights violations than human rights 
violations committed by a political leader—the latter is usually 
 
170 See infra notes 175–77 and accompanying text. 
171 An example in the United States is the Alien Tort Claims Act, which has 
been used to bring suits against companies that have collaborated, even in an 
indirect manner, with human rights abuses by the government of the country in 
which they are doing business.  See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1303 
(C.D. Cal. 2000) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(acknowledging that corporations can be held liable under the Alien Tort Claims 
Act for violations of international human rights norms in foreign countries). 
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limited to individuals who are courageous enough to speak out 
against the political leader. 
The willingness of countries to entertain such suits may be 
affected, in turn, by the extent to which TLH has created incentives 
for that country to increase its human rights enforcement 
mechanisms. 
7. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE STATE AS THE ULTIMATE GUARANTOR 
OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND 
THE COMMUNITY IDENTITY 
7.1. TLH and the State 
There is a tremendous amount of literature examining the 
effects of globalization on the ability of a state to regulate economic 
and other processes happening within itself.  What has been 
overlooked, however, is the dialectical relationship between the 
state and international law, and the state and the individual as a 
result of TLH.  There has also been relatively little research on the 
changing relationship between the state and the national and/or 
ethnic groups that live in the territory of the state as a result of 
economic and legal globalization. 
To the extent that tensions between the state and the different 
national, ethnic or religious groups have contributed to armed 
conflict and even genocide, TLH may hold the promise of 
ameliorating one of the greatest sources of conflict in the world 
today.  It can do so by separating the concept of the nation from the 
state, thereby eliminating the impetus for armed conflict between 
minority groups and the state.  Indeed, the principal underlying 
rationale for the European Union was to eliminate war in the 
European subcontinent as the functions of the state shifted from 
nation-states to a state authority unaffiliated with a specific 
national or ethnic group.172  This Article will demonstrate that the 
state’s role as the creator of community identity has been 
normatively problematic for exactly the reasons described above, 
and its role as the guarantor of individual and environmental 
interests is becoming increasingly irrelevant as an empirical matter.  
 
172 See, e.g., Europa, The History of the European Union, http://europa.eu 
/abc/history/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2010). (“The European Union is 
set up with the aim of ending the frequent and bloody wars between 
neighbours . . .”). 
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In order to understand how the process of globalization has 
affected the state, and the implications of that effect, it is important 
to define what the “state” is and has been, in terms of the essential 
functions it has served, and to determine how those functions have 
been affected by globalization. 
The state, by definition, possesses a permanent population, a 
defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into 
relations with other states.173  The functions of a state can generally 
be categorized as: (1) providing security and civil rights for 
individuals and communities within the state, with respect to 
internal and external actors; (2) providing rules for the conduct of 
economic activity within the state, including property rights; (3) 
providing services for the population in the state such as 
education, provision of water, transportation and other basic needs 
of the population; and (4) providing a sense of common identity 
for the citizens of the state.174 
7.2. The Nation-State 
“Nation-states,” i.e., those states which function as juridical 
and political embodiments of their dominant national group,175 
take the fourth function described above one step further by tying 
the national identity of the state/country to the identity of the 
dominant national/ethnic group within the country.  In a classic 
nation-state, the state expressly and directly promulgates the 
cultural identity and other interests of the dominant 
national/ethnic group within the state.  Examples of classic nation-
 
173 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 100 (1965) (describing an early articulation by the American Law 
Institute of the minimum requirements to be considered a state by other nations); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 
(1987) (“Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory a 
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages 
in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”). 
174 See Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Statehood and the Third Geneva 
Convention, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 131, 137–39 (2005) (explaining the traditional 
functions of states and nation-states). 
175 The nation-state is traditionally defined as “a relatively homogenous 
group of people with a feeling of common nationality living within the defined 
boundaries of an independent and sovereign state, especially a state containing one 
as opposed to several nationalities.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 1505 (1981) (emphasis added).  The term “nationality” is itself vague.  
It is commonly defined as “a usually large and closely associated aggregation of 
people having a common and distinguishing origin, tradition and language and 
potentially capable of or actually being organized in a nation-state.”  Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
818 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:3 
 
states include France, Japan, Germany, Bhutan, Nepal and Israel, 
where citizenship has traditionally been tied to either a 
sanguineous or cultural connection to a particular ethnic/national 
identity. 
A nation-state cannot have equal protection under the laws and 
non-discrimination for its citizens if the state itself is the juridical 
embodiment of only one ethnic/national group.  Therein lies the 
normative issue with those states that can be characterized as 
“nation-states.”  As this Article argues, however, the diminishing 
role of the state as a result of TLH suggests that the traditional role 
of the nation-state as the building-block of international law can be 
modified, and often even eliminated, without diminishing the four 
functions that citizens have traditionally drawn from the state. 
Although the contemporary dominance of the nation-state in 
the international legal system would seem to suggest that it is the 
natural building block and basic unit in international law, the 
discussion below illustrates that the nation-state (as opposed to the 
state itself) has historically been an aberration.176  As Stein Rokkan 
notes, even France, the quintessential nation-state, was still 
engaged in nation-building as late as the nineteenth century in its 
peripheral territories such as Brittany and Occitania.177  Eugen 
Weber gives figures from eighteen sixty-three that show 7,426,058 
Frenchmen did not speak French as their first language versus 
29,956,167 who did.178  He noted that the process of integrating 
certain regions such as Corsica was still ongoing in the twentieth 
century. 
7.3. TLH and the Nation-State 
TLH’s influence on the nation-state is profound and manifold.  
First, as state and lawmaking functions are increasingly assumed 
by multi-state entities, like in the case of the European Union, it 
becomes apparent that many traditional state functions do not 
have to be tied to a particular nation or state.  The traditional 
rationale for the nation-state is that the national identity 
 
176 See infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
177 See STEIN ROKKAN, Cities, States, and Nations: A Dimensional Model for the 
Study of Contrasts, in BUILDING STATES AND NATIONS 84 (S.N. Eisenstadt & Stein 
Rokkan eds., 1973) (describing the relatively modern nation-building activities 
undertaken by the French Empire). 
178 EUGEN WEBER, PEASANTS INTO FRENCHMAN: THE MODERNIZATION OF RURAL 
FRANCE 1870–1914, 500–01 (1976). 
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promulgated by the state reinforces the cohesion and unity of the 
state.  As discussed immediately below, however, we are 
increasingly witnessing lawmaking power in countries such as 
Spain, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, simultaneously flowing 
downward to the local level with respect to issues of local concern, 
and upwards to the international level for issues of economic or 
security concern.179  For example, the United Kingdom has 
witnessed the emergence of the Scottish and Welsh parliaments 
with jurisdiction over lawmaking of particular concern to the 
Scottish and Welsh national groups.180  Meanwhile, European 
Union law now comprises a substantial portion of the lawmaking 
done in any particular EU country.181  Much of the legislation 
resembles the kinds of federal legislation passed in the United 
States.  The irony, of course, is that as TLH makes the central 
government of the nation-state increasingly irrelevant, it also 
empowers local jurisdictions and national groups to assume 
lawmaking control over the issues most important to them. 
The concept of simultaneous delegation of powers to a higher 
level and devolution of other powers to the local level is alluded to 
by James Baker in a speech before the Berlin Meeting of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers of the Council on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe: 
Evolution and devolution are not alternatives, but 
complementary, and indeed interdependent 
developments . . . [T]he architects of a united Europe have 
adopted the principle of “subsidiarity,” something like 
American “federalism”—that is, the devolution of 
responsibility to the lowest level of government capable of 
performing it effectively.  By the same token, the process of 
devolution in the East will lead to fragmentation, conflict, 
and ultimately threaten democracy if it is not accompanied 
by the voluntary delegation of powers to national and even 
supranational levels for basic matters such as defense, 
 
179 See infra notes 179–80 and accompanying text. 
180 The Scottish Parliament, History, http://www.scottish.parliament.uk 
/vli/history/index.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2010) (“When the Scotland Act 1998 
was passed it led to the establishment of the first Scottish Parliament since 1707.”); 
Welsh Assembly Government, History, http://wales.gov.uk/about/history 
/?lang=en (last visited Jan. 14, 2010) (explaining that the National Assembly for 
Wales was established in 1999). 
181 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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trade, currency, and the protection of basic human rights—
particularly minority rights.182 
Second, TLH demonstrates that not only is the nation-state an 
unnecessary institution for primary lawmaking, a strong argument 
can be made that the nation-state can frequently, by its very 
definition, violate fundamental human rights. 
7.4. The Process of State Dissolution and Reformulation 
It may seem premature to question the suitability of the nation-
state as the foundational element of international law when the last 
decade has seen the proliferation of numerous nation-states 
throughout Eastern Europe and Asia, and increased demands for 
secession from national movements in countries as diverse as 
Canada, China, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Russia, Serbia, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, The Congo, and the United Kingdom. 
However, concurrent with the centrifugal process of 
nationalism and secession is an ongoing centripetal process of 
nation-states coming together to form larger political entities as 
exemplified by TLH.183  The seemingly contradictory centrifugal 
forces of nationalism and secession, and the centripetal forces of 
globalization, confederation and federation, can be understood as 
different stages of the same historical process that has been 
occurring since well before the Seventeenth Century.184  This 
historical process has consisted of roughly four stages:  (1) the 
formation of groups of individuals into an identifiable “nation,” 
“tribe” or “people;” (2) the formation by force of large, multi-ethnic 
empires, incorporating numerous nations, tribes or peoples into a 
single “state;” (3) the dissolution of those multi-ethnic empires into 
their elemental tribes or nation-states; (4) the coming together of 
those nation-states, or national groups, into larger associations of a 
federative or confederate nature185 on the basis of equality and 
 
182 James A. Baker, The Euro-Atlantic Architecture: From East to West, 
Address Before the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers in Berlin (June 18, 1991), 
reprinted in VOJTECH MASTNY, THE HELSINKI PROCESS AND THE REINTEGRATION OF 
EUROPE 1986–1991, at 308 (1992) (emphasis added). 
183 See supra Section 4. 
184 For a cogent history of the development of the nation-state, see Rokkan, 
supra note 177. 
185 The Swiss Confederation is a notable early historical example of this 
process of confederation, as is the United States, which was initially a 
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mutuality.  This last stage, incorporating the concept of initial 
equality and mutuality, harks back to the concept of “original 
contract,” a concept which has formed much of the theoretical 
foundation for our modern concepts of individual human rights 
and which John Locke, and more recently John Rawls, have 
devoted considerable attention.186  This Article will refer to this 
entire process as “State Dissolution and Reformulation.” 
The process of State Dissolution and Reformulation can occur 
through forcible or peaceful disintegration of a multi-ethnic 
political entity into separate political entities (“State 
Dissolution”).187  Alternatively, the process can occur internally, 
within the political framework of an existing state, through the 
peaceful accommodation of the legitimate aspirations of ethnic and 
national minority groups while still preserving the political 
integrity of the original state (“Internal National 
Accommodation”).188  Thus, the creation of the nation-state out of 
multi-ethnic empires or states is simply one—rarely used— 
alternative for a state to respond to the pressures of its multi-ethnic 
character.  To the extent the nation-state does not accommodate its 
national, religious or other minorities through National 
Accommodation, it will do so unwillingly through State 
Dissolution. 
International law must respond to the concomitant centrifugal 
and centripetal forces of State Dissolution and Reformulation and 
avoid the worst aspects of nationalism.  This can be done by 
acknowledging ethnic and national aspirations for cultural and 
national development while simultaneously disassociating those 
aspirations from the concept of statehood.  Our concept of the state 
must be revised.  The state’s role cannot constitute the juridical and 
political embodiment of the dominant national group.  The state 
must be disassociated from the nation precisely because no 
 
confederation of sovereign entities.  A more contemporary example is the 
European Union and the emerging MERCOSUR/L Union in South America. 
186 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (rendering 
thoroughly a “justice as fairness” theory based off of contract principles). 
187 Examples of states and entities that underwent this process include: the 
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the Ottoman Empire, the Hapsburg 
Empire, the Holy Roman Empire, the Roman Empire, the Macedonian Empire, 
and the Persian Empire. 
188 Examples of states that underwent this process include: Canada, the 
present-day United Kingdom, the Swiss Confederation, and, to some extent, 
Spain. 
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national group should claim a monopoly or hegemonic interest in 
the coercive power of the state.189 
The stages described in the process of State Dissolution and 
Reformulation are far from discrete and may frequently overlap, 
and the states emerging from the process are themselves far from 
static entities.  The United States, for example, is a state which was 
originally a confederation of several smaller states.  The 
“American” people, or nation, which emerged from that 
confederation has itself evolved from one that identified itself 
entirely as one of European origin to one that has slowly, but still 
incompletely recognized its diverse ethnic and racial composition. 
Moreover, it may be difficult to distinguish many 
contemporary nation-states from their multi-ethnic imperial 
predecessors.  For example, Spain can be viewed as a classic 
nation-state, where the state is the embodiment of the dominant 
Castilian national identity, but tolerates the existence of other 
nationalities such as the Basque and Catalan nations.190  Yet, in 
definitional terms, this may be little different from the Roman 
Empire, where a central Latin nation asserted its political 
domination over other nations, while largely tolerating the 
existence of the other nationalities as long as they did not threaten 
the political supremacy of Rome.191  This resemblance exists to the 
extent that both entities: (1) contained national minorities within 
 
189 The coercive hegemony of one group over others within a single political 
entity, particularly to the point that it violates the rights of ethnic, racial, religious 
or national minorities constitutes a violation of numerous international human 
rights treaties, declarations and customary international law.  See, e.g., the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 72, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 2, 1948) (prohibiting deprivation of 
rights and freedoms on the basis of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status); 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 212 (specifying the ways in which 
coercive hegemony on the basis of race is prohibited, as first articulated by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
190 See Estatuto de Autonomia Para el Pais Vasco [The Statute of Autonomy 
of the Basque Country] (B.O.E. 1979, 30177) (creating autonomy for Basque 
Country within Spain).  See also Reforma del Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña 
[Reform of The Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia] (B.O.E. 2006, 13087) (creating 
autonomy for Catalonia within Spain). 
191 See generally A.N. SHERWIN-WHITE, RACIAL PREJUDICE IN IMPERIAL ROME 86–
101 (1967).  Cf. ERICH S. GRUEN, CULTURE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN REPUBLICAN 
ROME (1992); Paul Veyne, The Hellenization of Rome and the Question of 
Acculturations, 106 DIOGENES 1, 1–27 (Scott Walker trans., 1979). 
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their state boundaries;192 and (2) were created by a coercive process 
through which subaltern nationalities were subordinated to the 
dominant national group’s political will, but permitted to retain 
their own cultural and/or religious identity.  In fact, this Article 
argues that, in many cases, the process of nation-state formation 
has frequently been more coercive towards subaltern national 
groups than the process by which multi-ethnic empires have been 
created. 
Contemporary models for the separation of national identity 
and the traditional functions of the state are suggested by the 
European Union, Switzerland, Canada, and Belgium, and to a 
lesser extent, the emerging supranational and international 
economic, political and social institutions such as international 
human rights bodies, international trade agreements, and multi-
purpose political bodies such as the United Nations, the Council of 
Europe, the Organization of American States, and the African 
Union.  It can be argued that the entire process of globalization 
involves the weakening of the nation-state’s monopoly control 
over economic, social and even political forces.193  The success, or 
lack thereof, of these national models appears to be largely 
determined by the extent to which the original union of different 
nationalities was accompanied by mutuality and non-coercion.  
Thus, those multi-ethnic states whose political control over diverse 
national groups lacked this mutuality and non-coercion, such as 
Canada,194 stand on less stable ground, even as they attempt 
Internal National Accommodation.  In Canada, this attempt at 
overcoming the lack of mutuality through Internal National 
Accommodation appears to be working, for now.195  In other cases, 
 
192 See, e.g., Stephen Kinzer, Germans Plan to Make it Easier for Some to Obtain 
Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1993, at A8 (noting that Germany currently has a 
citizenship law based principally on German nationality).  See also Outsiders All: 
Japan, ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 1993, at 36 (discussing Japan’s treatment of foreign 
residents and current criteria of who is a Japanese national). 
193 See, e.g., Munck, supra note 151, at 12. 
194 Gregory Marchildon & Edward Maxwell, Quebec’s Right of Secession Under 
Canadian and International Law, 32 VA. J. INT’L L. 583, 611 (1992) (“While New 
France’s incorporation into the British empire in 1763 was manifestly against the 
will of its people, their descendants joined the Canadian federation in 1867 in  
more voluntary circumstances.”). 
195 Canada’s efforts at Internal National Accommodation appear to be 
bearing fruit as the support for secession has been progressively declining over 
the last few years.  See, e.g., Ian Austen, Seeking Majority, Quebec’s Premier Sets 
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such as Belgium, the outcome is considerably more ambiguous 
with persistent political and cultural conflict between the Flemish 
and the Walloon ethnic groups.196  Other multi-ethnic countries, 
such as Russia, do not even attempt Internal National 
Accommodation in as significant a manner as Canada and Belgium 
have, and have suffered the attendant consequences.197 
Nevertheless, the examples of Canada, Europe, Belgium and 
Switzerland demonstrate the possibility of separating the economic 
and defense functions of the state from the state’s traditional 
function as the juridical and political embodiment of the dominant 
national group in a particular geographical territory.  Canada also 
provides an example of how Internal National Accommodation 
can avoid State Dissolution, with its frequently negative 
consequences.  The United States, while not presently facing the 
likelihood of State Dissolution, nevertheless provides a model of 
how principles of National Accommodation can help remedy the 
past injustices to its racial and ethnic minorities, and incorporate 
those previously excluded groups into the national legal and 
political identity.198 
In summary, TLH plays an integral role in the process of 
Internal National Accommodation by diffusing decision making to 
 
Election, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A14 (“Quebec’s separation from Canada will 
not be a major theme of any platform.”). 
196 See generally James D. Wilets, The Demise of the Nation-State: Towards a New 
Theory of the State Under International Law, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 193, 224 (1999) 
(chronicling the political pressure on Belgium caused by the Flemish minority); 
Paul Belien, After Belgium: Will Flanders and The Netherlands Reunite?, CANADA FREE 
PRESS, Aug. 25, 2007, http://www.canadafreepress.com/2007/brussels082507 
.htm (“Since the 1970s Flemish parties have radicalized, demanding larger 
autonomy over welfare issues.”). 
197 After years of Chechnya trying to break away from the Russian 
Federation, resulting in war, economic downfall, and the breeding of radicalism, 
Chechnya is being reconstructed, but it is unclear whether the conflict is really 
over.  See Luke Harding, War-Ravaged Chechnya Transformed, But at What Price?, 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 22, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world 
/2008/feb/22/russia. 
198 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV; Education Amendments of 
1972 tit. IX; Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88–38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56 (1963); Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1975, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006), Pub. L. No. 
90-202, § 2, 81 Stat. 602 (1967); Fair Housing Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006); 
Age Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6101–6107 (2006); Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2006); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, tits. VI–VII , §§ 601, 701, 78 Stat. 252–53 (1964); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
Pub. L. No. 89–110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (1965); Voting Rights Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91–285–110, § 2, 84 Stat. 314 (1970). 
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both the local and supranational level, thereby decreasing the 
stakes any one national group has in entirely controlling the 
previously considerable power of the state.  With Internal National 
Accommodation all the more possible because of TLH, the nation-
state becomes all the more irrelevant and inappropriate as a 
foundation of international law. 
8. CONCLUSION 
The era has passed when international law, defined as one rule 
affecting more than one country, was largely a creation of nation-
states acting solely through traditional international legal 
institutions and through formal international law such as treaties 
or customary international law.  The process of global legal norm 
formation is more decentralized than currently recognized, and 
operates on a global, regional, national, corporate, and individual 
level.  The traditional definition of international law is not only 
inaccurate, but it fails to capture the full scope of the transnational 
legal harmonization taking place in the world as a result of 
economic and legal globalization, and the potential opportunities 
such a process presents. 
Such opportunities include: (1) the ability of the world 
community to regulate transnational corporations that are 
increasingly able to produce their products in countries with little 
to no regulation and sell their products in countries with effective 
environment, consumer, labor, and human rights protection, 
similar to how federal law regulates business activity across state 
borders; (2) the ability to “ratchet up” environmental, human 
rights, labor rights, and other standards for the public’s protection 
among varying coalitions of countries without relying solely on 
global institutions that are hampered by the lowest common 
denominator of their diverse membership; (3) separating the 
economic, security, and protective functions of the state from a 
particular dominant national or religious group within or among 
countries, thereby reducing the greatest single source of violent 
conflict in the Twentieth century:  conflict based on race, ethnicity 
or religion; and (4) facilitating the processes described immediately 
above by creating federal or quasi-federal economic and/or 
political entities that can consolidate the process of TLH within the 
framework of what we normally consider domestic law. 
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